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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first 
essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We 
can find ample evidences in existing literatures which show that institutional investors play a 
vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to 
activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off 
activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to 
add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional 
investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint problem in the firm. Institutional investors 
have large financial networks and make large financial investment in firms. Their presence 
might help firms attract external capital. I am using 2 financial constraint measurements; KZ 
index (Lamont, Polk, Saa-Requejo, 2001) and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). I am also 
adding additional measurement for financial constraint using notes payable. I find evidences 
to support the hypotheses that institutional investors’ presence and ownership mitigate 
financial constraints. The title of my second essay is “Long- and Short-Term Institutional 
Investors and Payout Policy”. In the second essay, I examine the relationship between the 
firms’ payout policy and the presence/ownership of certain type of institutional investors. I 
classify the types of institutional investors using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification of 
institutional investors. I find that the presence and the magnitude of long term institutional 
investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of dividend. I also find that the 
presence and the magnitude of short term institutional investors positively affect the 
likelihood and the magnitude of share repurchases. This study suggests that the presence of 
different types of institutional investors can affect payout policy. 
 Keywords: Transient, dedicated, Monitoring, Trading 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Previous literature has found evidence that institutional investors play a vital role in the 
corporate world. Many have linked institutional investors to activism and monitoring benefits 
(Smith 1996, Gillian and Starks 2000, Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999, Demiralp et al, 
2011). However, so far as to my knowledge, I haven’t seen literatures which investigate 
whether the presence of institutional investors can mitigate financial constraint in a firm.    
In this research, I want to add another dimension of institutional investors’ role by 
examining institutional investors from the liquidity perspectives. I am looking at liquidity in 
terms of the ability of a firm to generate adequate amount of cash to meet firm’s need for 
cash or financing. Firms can meet future liquidity by issuing new claims, obtain bank line of 
credit or/and by holding claims on other firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). Firms which 
are unable to raise capital and financing are considered as financially constrained. The main 
question I am investigating in this research is, will the presence of institutional investors and 
institutional ownership mitigate financial constraint and improve firms’ liquidity. I wish to 
examine institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraints in the firm. Since 
institutional investors have large financial networks and make large financial investment in 
firms, does their presence help firms attract external capital. If institutional presence helps 
firms attract external capital, their presence should mitigate financial constraint.  
This research can contribute to existing literature by providing evidence whether 
institutional investors are able to mitigate financial constraints. Liquidity is a crucial 
component in a firm and it is an important fuel for a firm. Funds enable firms to take 
advantage of growth prospects, strengthen existing investment and future investment, or 
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simply surviving. (Tirole, 2006). Hence, it is important to understand factors that can mitigate 
financial constraints and improve liquidity. In this essay, the factors that I wish to examine 
are institutional presence and institutional ownership. I wish to argue that since institutional 
investors are financial institutions themselves; their presence in the firm might provide firm 
with access to more capital and different sources of capital. Gatev and Strahan (2006) and 
Sufi (2009) stress that banks are the most efficient liquidity providers in the economy. 
Financial institutions are part of institutional investors. Sufi (2007, 2009) and Gatev and 
Strahan (2006) also document that line of credit is an important source of liquidity. Line of 
credit is also known as revolving credit facilities or loan commitments provided by banks. I 
expect that the presence of institutional investors improves the financial condition of the firm 
and should mitigate the financial constraint in a firm. I also expect that firms with higher 
institutional ownerships will exhibit lower financial constraints. 
1.2 Literature Reviews 
Institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world, in investment and in other 
areas. The empirical evidence on institutional investors has shown us the importance of 
institutional investors and the many benefits they bring to the firm.  
The Evolution of Institutional Investors Literatures 
Institutional investors have been linked to activism (Smith 1996, Gillian and Starks 2000) and 
monitoring (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). Demiralp et al (2011) find evidence of 
monitoring benefit by institutional investors on seasoned equity offerings.   
Institutional investors are known as sophisticated investors because they are able to hire good 
analyst and able to have more resources. There is evidence of improvement in information 
asymmetry with institutional investors’ presence (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990). Institutional 
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investors are also known to bring improvements in a firm. Hribar, Jenkins and Wang (2004) 
and Burns, Kedia and Lipson (2006) find evidence that institutional investors’ presence can 
mitigate the effect of earning management. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find evidence that 
institutional investor mitigate the cost of debt in firm. Their research mainly focuses on 
corporate bond yield. Hoechle et al (2012) find that institutional investor presence improves 
the diversification discount in a firm. Asbaugh, Collins and LaFond (2004) analyse the 
corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. They find that the institutional ownership 
is positively related to risk. Abarbanell, Bushee and Raedy (2003) investigate whether 
institutional investors rebalance their portfolio in the event of spin offs. They find evidence 
that institutional investors that are subjected to stringent fiduciary standards are more likely 
to immediately rebalance their portfolio after spin off events. Using Bushee’s institutional 
investors classification data, institutional investors are categorized into these legal types; 
banks, insurance companies, investment companies, independent investment advisor, 
corporate (private) pension fund, public pension fund, university and foundation.  
The vital role and the benefits of institutional investors in a firm are obvious and lucid. 
However, since we are trying to link institutional investors and financial constraint, it is 
crucial to understand the link between liquidity and financial constraint.  
Measuring Financial Constraint 
Financial constraint is being linked to the firms’ ability to raise capital and financing. As 
discussed earlier, we are looking at liquidity from the perspective of a firms’ ability to 
generate adequate amount of cash to meet the firms’ need for financing or investment. The 
definition of liquidity in this essay is improved access to capital. Firms can meet future 
liquidity by issuing new claims obtaining bank line of credit or/and holding claims on other 
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firms (Holstrom and Tirole, 1998). Firms which are unable to raise sufficient capital are 
considered financially constrained.  
Lamont, Polk and Sae-Requejo (2001) defined financial constraint as frictions that prevent 
firm from funding desired investment. With the definition of financial constraint as the spread 
between internal and external cost of funds, using manufacturing firms as their sample, 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) find that firms which are financially constrained as 
more sensitive to fluctuation in their cash flow. They investigate the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity by dividing the firms using certain classification (dividend payout, retention 
earnings) as their priori measurement of financial constraint. Using Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) or FHP (1988) financial constraint measurement, Hoshi, Kasyhap and 
Scharfstein (1991) find evidence using Japanese firms as their sample, creditors that are in 
the same group (industrial group) with the shareholders are less financially constrained. 
  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) refute that investment-cash flow sensitivities is an accurate 
measurement for financial constraint. They argue that theoretically, investment-cash flow 
sensitivities do not necessarily increase with the degree of financial constraint which 
contradicts FHP (1988) argument. Using FHP (1988) sample of financially constrained firms 
from different sources, they find empirical evidence which contradicts FHP (1988) results.  
Using their classification scheme (later known as KZ index), they conclude that investment-
cash flow sensitivities is not a correct measure for financial constraint. Using KZ index from 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) investigate whether 
financial constraint characteristics can be observed via stock returns. They find evidence 
which support that it is reflected in stock price and they conclude that financial constraint are 
subject to common shock, not the firm specific risk. Whited and Wu (2006) construct an 
index of financial constraints based on a standard intertemporal investment model which is 
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augmented to take into account financial frictions via generalized method of moments 
(GMM). They find that the returns of constrained firms move together which suggest there 
exist financial constraint factor. KZ index is also not exempted from having its own critics. 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) cast some doubts concerning using KZ index as financial 
constraint measurement based on a set of financially constraint firms hand collected from 
10K SEC filings. From the 10K SEC filings, they identify financially constraint firms and 
assigned them in a logit form model. The logit model is then regressed against variables used 
to construct KZ index such as leverage, cash, Q, debt and dividends. They compare the 
results with KZ index and find some inconsistency in terms of the signs. They conclude that 
size and firms’ age can do a better job in measuring financial constraint compared to KZ 
index. 
Using bank line of credit as a measure of financial constraint, Sufi (2009) provides evidence 
that lack access of bank line of credit is more powerful in terms of statistical significance 
compared to other financial constraint measurement traditionally used in literatures such as 
FHP (1988) cash flow sensitivity measurement.  
1.3 Hypotheses Development 
Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) or LPS (2001) define financial constraint as the 
friction that prevents a firm from funding all desired investment. As mentioned by LPS 
(2001), financial constraints might be caused by the inability to borrow, inability to issue 
equity or illiquidity of assets. As discussed earlier, there are evidences which suggest that the 
presence of institutional investors improve the condition of a firm (Demiralp et al (2011), 
O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), Hribar, Jenkins and Wang (2004), Burns, Kedia and Lipson 
(2006), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Hoechle et al (2012)). We would expect the same 
would hold for firm with financial constraints. The presence of institutional investors can 
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mitigate the financial constraint condition in a firm. Institutional investors comprises of bank 
trust, corporate pension fund, independent investment advisor, insurance company, 
investment company, public pension fund, and university and foundation endowment 
(Bushee, 1998, 2001). I wish to argue that since institutional investors are financial 
institutions themselves, their presence may provide firm with access to more capital and 
different sources of capital. Hence, this can help mitigate or lower the financial constraints 
that a firm might face. The general hypotheses is as following; I expect that firms with 
institutional investors’ presence and higher institutional ownership would exhibit lower 
financial constraint. I am adopting 2 financial constraint measurements; KZ index (LPS, 
2001) and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). Using KZ index, the first hypotheses is as 
following; firms with institutional presence and higher institutional ownership would exhibit 
lower KZ index. High KZ index indicates a firm which is highly constrained. If the first 
hypotheses holds, I would expect that institutional presence and higher institutional 
ownership negatively affects KZ index.  
Sufi (2007, 2009) and Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that line of credit is an important 
source of liquidity. Most of the firms in Sufi (2009) sample have at least one quarter of line 
of credit as debt outstanding. In Sufi (2009), he documents that in previous literature such as 
in Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) and Gatev and Strahan (2006), they emphasized that 
banks are the most efficient liquidity providers. There is also evidence that there has been a 
growing use of bank line of credit over the years (Morris, Sellon, 1995, Sufi, 2007).  As 
discussed earlier, the presence of institutional investors may provide firms access to more 
capital and different sources of capital.  Since there are evidences which show that line of 
credit is one of the important sources of liquidity, in the next section, I wish to focus on one 
type of capital which is the line of credit. This will also make this research differ from 
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Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) because their focus is on corporate bond yield. The bank line of 
credit is also known as revolving credit facilities (Sufi, 2009). Bank line of credit can be 
considered as an important source of liquidity to a firm because of its flexibility and 
convenience to the borrower. It can serve as a liquidity buffer and it is also known to protect 
borrowers from market uncertainty such as credit rationing or credit crunch (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). The presence of institutional investors would improve firms’ ability to obtain 
bank line of credit in their liquidity management. So, my second hypotheses is as following; 
firms with institutional investors presence and higher institutional ownership, would exhibit 
higher access to bank line of credit. Financial networks typically include financial institutions 
and banks. So, institutional presence in a firm brings with it the ability of these institutions to 
arrange line of credit access through their networks (Fan, Subramaniam, and Ye, 2014)    
Loan agreement would usually include some financial covenant as part of the term 
and condition in the agreement. The lender would expect the borrower to be able to adhere to 
certain limits or conditions agreed by both parties prior to the lending. Sufi (2009) also 
investigates whether firms are in compliance with the financial covenant or in violation of 
financial covenant. Sufi (2009) finds that when a firm violates a covenant, the firm will lose 
access to a substantial amount of its line of credit.  
As an addition to this research, I also include notes payable as another measurement 
for financial constraint. Notes payable is a form of short term debt for capital, financing and 
investment purposes. Using the same argument, the presence of institutional investors should 
improve the firms’ ability to obtain or have access to notes payable. The hypotheses is as 
following; firms with institutional investors’ presence and higher institutional ownership 
would exhibit higher access to notes payable. 
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1.4 Methodology 
To test our first hypotheses, I am using the KZ index by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo 
(2001) as our measurement of financial constraint. The first model is as following; 
 
tititititititi HISIDNWNCTAMVEPIHKZ ,4,5,4,3,2,11, ββββββα ++++++=
Model 1 
 
where  
=tiKZ , KZ index 
=tiPIH , Institutional ownership for firm i and at time t  
=MVE Market Value of Equity, 
=NCTA Non cash total asset, 
=NW Net worth, 
=SID Number of segments 
=HI Herfindahl Index 
Institutional ownership is the ratio between the total shares held by institutional investors and 
total shares outstanding.  
Following Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001), the KZ index is measured as following, 





−




−




++




−=
K
Cash
K
Div
TC
DebtQ
K
CFKZ *315.1*3678.39*139193.3*2826389.0*001909.1
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 where CF is the cash flow, K  is the tangible asset, Q  is total investment, TC is the total 
capital, and Div is the dividend. 
To test for our second hypotheses, the model is as following, 
Model 2 
( )
ti
titititititititi
MB
HISIDNWNCTAMVESizePIHLCPb
,8
,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,
β
βββββββα
+
++++++++= 
 
where 
LC =Line of credit where ( )LCPb is equal to 1 if there is access to line of credit and  
( )LCPb  is equal to 0 if there is no access to line of credit. 
Size  = log of total asset. 
The alternative model to test for the second hypotheses is as following, 
Model 3 
tititititititi HISIDNWNCTAMVEPIHNP ,4,5,4,3,2,11, ββββββα ++++++=  
where  
NP = notes payable. 
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Endogeniety problem  
Firms with high financial constraints could attract institutional ownership through other 
mean. For example through dividend policy. Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) tax clientele 
model argue that institutions have a relative advantage to monitor firms or detect firms’ 
quality, so firms issue dividend to attract large institutions. So, it could be financial 
constraints affecting institutional ownership, and causing spurious correlation between 
institutional ownership. In this case, we might face endogeniety issue. To address the 
endogeneity issue that might occur in this study, I am using the endogenous self-selection 
model and Heckman (1979) model approach.  
Endogenous self-selection model and Heckman’s (1979) approach 
There are possibilities that firms’ financial constraint can affect institutional ownership. We 
are looking into possibilities that the institutional investors choose firms which are less 
financially constrained. In this case, there is a potential endogeneity issue which might arise 
in this research. To address this problem, I am using the endogenous self-selection model and 
Heckman’s (1979) approach.  
The first stage model is as following,  
1,31,21,111,_ −−−− +++= titititi SizeLEVKZPIHPb βββα  
where, 
=−1,_ tiPIHPb Likelihood of institutional presence, 
=−1,tiKZ Prior year KZ index for firm i  , 
=−1,tiLEV  Prior year leverage for firm i , 
=−1,tiSize  Prior year size for firm i . 
11 
 
The prior year is denoted as ( 1−t ) in the model. Leverage and Size are control variables for 
institutional ownership and presence. To measure Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, 
first I will estimate the previous equation in order to obtain the Inverse Mills Ratio. Then I 
will run the second stage model as following, 
titi
titititititititi
IMMB
AHISIDNWBENCTAMVEPIHKZ
,12,11
,10,9,8,7,6,5,42, _
ββ
βββββββα
++
++++++++=


  
where  
=IM Inverse Mills Ratio. 
1.5 Data Description 
For KZ index and notes payable measurement, the sample period spans from 1981until 2013. 
Using Sufi (2009) data set, the sample period for bank line of credit spans from 1996 to 2003. 
The bank line of credit originated from 10-K SEC filings and the line of credit information is 
only made available in 1996.  So, in this essay I have 2 separate data sets.  I am going to use 
the first data set to test the first and third hypotheses pertaining KZ index and notes payable. 
To test the second hypotheses, I am going to use the second sample. 
Following Sufi (2009), Compustat data contains non-financial US based firms with at least 4 
consecutive years between 1996 and 2003 of positive data on total assets (item 6), four 
consecutive years of non missing data on total liabilities (item 181), total sales (item 12), a 
measure of EBITDA (item 13), share price (item 199), share outstanding (item 25), preferred 
stock (item 10), deferred taxes (item 35), and convertible debt (item 79). Following Sufi 
(2009), firms are required to have 4 consecutive years of book leverage ratios between 0 and 
1.  
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Institutional Ownership 
Following Bushee (1998), institutional ownership is measured as the ratio of total shares held 
by institutional investors and total shares outstanding.  I obtain quarterly data for institutional 
ownership from Thomson-Reuters Institutional holdings 13(F) database. Institutional 
investors with $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities are required by United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission to file a report using a Form 13(F). In this form, 
institutional investment manager is required to disclose information regarding their holdings. 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional holdings 13(F) database provides us with information from the 
Form 13(F) filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission.  
Financial constraint measurement 
KZ index and Notes Payable 
Cash flow is computed as the ratio of total income before extraordinary items (Compustat 
Item #18) and depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #14) with property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat Item #8) (LPS, 2001). K is property, plant and equipment (Compustat 
Item #8).  Investment opportunity or Q is computed as the ratio of total equity (Compustat 
Item #6) and CRSP December Market Equity (CRSP) subtracted by total common equity 
(Compustat Item #60) and deferred tax (Compustat Item #74) with total equity (Compustat 
Item #6). Debt is computed as total long term debt (Compustat Item #9) and debt in current 
liabilities (Compustat Item #34). Total capital is computed as total long term debt and debt in 
current liabilities plus stockholders equity (Compustat Item #216). Dividend is the total of 
common stock dividend and preferred stock dividend (Compustat Item #216 + Compustat 
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Item #19). Cash is the cash and short term investment (Compustat Item #1). Notes payable 
(Compustat item #206) is divided by total asset.  
Sufi (2009) Line of Credit Database 
Using Sufi (2009) line of credit data, the sample consist of non-financial US based firms span 
from 1996 to 2003. Line of credit is also known as revolving credit facilities or loan 
commitments. Usually, banks or financing companies provides line of credit. The used line of 
credit is the debt obligation while the unused line of credit remains off the balance sheet. 
There are 2 types of samples in this database; the full sample and the random sample. The full 
sample is obtained by searching the 10-K SEC filing using certain phrases which indicate that 
the firms have bank line of credit. The phrases as indicated by Sufi (2009) are “credit lines”, 
“credit facility”, “revolving credit agreement”. “bank credit line”, “working capital facility”, 
“lines of credit”, and “line of credit”. In order to reduce error in the search term, Sufi (2009) 
refines the search by manually search to make  sure that 10 lines before the search phrases do 
not contain any “no”, “do not have a”, “not have any”, “retired our”, “terminated our” and 
“equity. Next, Sufi (2009) refines the search again by manually examining whether the search 
term contains the words “expired”, “terminated” and “was terminated”. 
For random sample, the sample is collected manually where 300 firms are randomly selected. 
In this sample, the financial covenant violation information is also collected. These covenants 
require firms to maintain their financial ratios at a certain rate.  
Control Variables 
I am selecting control variable consistent with Sufi (2009). Book debt is the short term plus 
long term debt (Compustat item 34 + Compustat item 9) divided by total asset (item 6). Asset 
tangibility is tangible asset (item #8) divided by non-cash total asset. Balance sheet cash is 
14 
 
measured using item #1. The market to book ratio is calculated using total assets less the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity less cash and divide all with non-cash 
total assets. Book value of equity is the book value of assets (item #6) less the book value of 
total liabilities (item #181) and preferred stock (item #10) plus deferred taxes (item 35). The 
market value of equity is the common shares outstanding (item #25) multiplied by share price 
(item #199). Cash flow is EBITDA (item #13) divided by non-cash total assets. Net worth 
cash adjusted is non cash total assets less total liabilities, divided by non-cash assets. The 
number of segments measure diversification where the number of segment is higher when a 
firm is more diversified. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is measured as the sum of squared 
market shares computed using Compustat total asset (item #6). The Herfindahl index is based 
on 3 digits SIC code.  
The sample is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate extreme outliers.  
1.6 Analysis  
KZ index 
Summary Statistics for KZ index 
As discussed earlier, I am using 2 financial constraint measurements which are KZ index 
(LPS, 2001) and line of credit (Sufi, 2009). As an additional measurement, I include notes 
payable as an alternative to line of credit. As discussed earlier, since line of credit data set is 
limited from 1996 to 2003, I am going to use 2 separate data sets for both measurements. 
Although we are using 2 different data sets, the results are consistent to support the 
hypotheses which I am going to discuss in the next section.  
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Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
              
KZ 34880 3.6983843 -0.047923 35.004483 -53.905615 350.302526 
NP 314915 428.385628 0 7912.61 -1072 605462.51 
PIH 15396 0.0467616 0.0223678 0.0736746 5.52E-09 1.6019429 
MVE 34880 4084 260.66007 18800.35 0 626550.35 
NCTA 34880 3774.04 209.6835 19291.92 0 747592 
NW 34879 0.1551409 0.4543012 5.4700726 -709.25 0.9987654 
BVE 34880 1937.21 143.176 9826.77 -84777 311097 
SID_T 276051 27.7807724 3 79.970083 1 1618 
HI_Asset 34880 0.026442 0.0151856 0.030906 0.0045636 1 
              
          Table 1: Summary statistics for KZ Index, Notes Payable and the control variables 
This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in the sample. The sample period spans 
from 1980 to 2013. Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares held by 
institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  KZ index is measured as 
following; 





−




−




++




−=
K
Cash
K
Div
TC
DebtQ
K
CFKZ *315.1*3678.39*139193.3*2826389.0*001909.1
 
where CF is the cash flow, K  is the tangible asset, Q  is total investment, TC is the total 
capital, and Div is the dividend.  
Table 1 is the summary statistics for sample firms using KZ index and notes payable as the 
financial constraint measurement. For this sample, the time period spans from 1980 to 2013. 
The data starts from the year 1980 because the institutional holdings data on Thomson-
Reuters 13(F) Institutional holdings database is only available from year 1980 onwards.  
After winsorizing the data at 5th and 95th percentile to mitigate outliers and after ensuring that 
there is no missing observations in the data set, we have 34,880 observations in this data set. 
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Using 34,880 firm-year observation, the distribution statistics for the KZ index are as 
following; mean, median and standard deviation for the index are -3.3933, -0.9254 and 
13.1714 respectively. The minimum and the maximum values for the KZ index are -53.9056 
and 350.3025. Our alternative financial constraint measurement using notes payable (NP) has 
a mean of 428.3856, median of 0 and the standard deviation of 7912.61. The minimum value 
is -1072 and the maximum value is 605,462.51 respectively. Our variable of interest which is 
the institutional ownership (PIH) where it is measured as the ratio of total shares held by 
institutional investors and the total shares outstanding, has a mean of 0.0468, a median of 
0.0224 and the standard deviation of 0.0737.  The minimum and the maximum value for 
institutional ownership is 0.0000 and 1.6019 respectively. The market value of equity (MVE) 
is measured as common shares outstanding multiply with the share price. The mean, median 
and the standard deviation for market value of equity are 4084, 260.66 and 18,800.35 
respectively. I am going to divide all the firm characteristics control variables with total asset 
to control for size. The minimum and maximum are 0.0000 and 626550.35 respectively. Non 
cash total asset (NCTA) is measured as the total asset minus cash. The mean and median are 
3774.04 and 209.6835 respectively. The minimum and maximum values are 0.0000 and 
747,592 respectively. The standard deviation is 19,291.92. Net worth (NW) is measured as 
non-cash total asset minus total liabilities divided by non-cash total asset where mean and 
median are 0.1551 and 0.4543 respectively. The standard deviation is 5.4700 and the 
minimum and maximum values are -709.25 and 0.9987 respectively. Book value of equity 
(BVE) is measured as the book values of assets minus book value of total liabilities plus 
preferred stock plus deferred taxes. The mean and median are 1937.21 and 143.176 
respectively. The standard deviation is 9826.77 and the minimum and maximum values are    
-84777 and 311097 respectively. The mean, median and standard deviation for number of 
segments to measure diversification are 27, 3, and 79.9701 respectively. The minimum and 
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maximum value for numbers of segments are 1 and 1618 respectively. Herfindahl index is 
defined as the sum of squared market shares using 3 digits SIC. The market shares of firm i in 
industry j in year t is computed using total asset (Compustat item #6).  
 
KZ IO MVE NCTA NW BVE SID HI_Asset 
                  
KZ 1.0000        
PIH -0.0110 1.0000 
 
     
MVE -0.0523 0.0191 1.0000      
NCTA 0.0011 0.0050 0.7340 1.0000     
NW -0.1469 0.0159 0.0197 0.0049 1.0000    
BVE -0.0147 0.0065 0.8567 0.8867 0.0268 1.0000   
SID 0.0014 0.0578 0.2689 0.3398 0.0269 0.2807 1.0000 
 HI_Asset -0.0045 0.0233 -0.0595 -0.0215 0.0523 -0.0521 0.0857 1.0000 
                  
         Table 2: Correlation Matrix between the dependent and independent variables 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix between all variables of interest. Institutional 
ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares held by institutional investors divided by the 
total shares outstanding.  KZ index is measured as following; 
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where CF is the cash flow, K  is the tangible asset, Q  is total investment, TC is the total 
capital, and Div is the dividend. MVE is the market value of equity, NCTA is the non-cash 
total asset, NW is net worth, BE is the book value of equity, SID is the number of segments 
and HI_Asset is the Herfindahl Asset measured by total asset. According to LPS (2001), the 
higher the value of KZ index, the firm is more likely to be constrained. In this case, according 
to my hypotheses, I expect a negative correlation between KZ index and institutional 
18 
 
ownership (PIH). From the table, there is a negative relationship between KZ and 
institutional investors (PIH). This relationship indicates the initial evidence which supports 
our first hypotheses where firms with higher institutional ownership exhibit lower financial 
constraints.   
Regression Analysis for KZ Index  
Table 3 reports the ordinary least square regression for firm-year sample. The dependent 
variable is KZ index measured as following; 

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where CF is the cash flow, K  is the tangible asset, Q  is total investment, TC is the total 
capital, and Div is the dividend. MVE is the market value of equity, NCTA is the non-cash 
total asset, NW is net worth, BE is book value of equity, SID is the number of segments and 
HI_Asset is the Herfindahl Asset measured by total asset. For each variable, I report the 
coefficient estimates (in bold) and the standard error (in italic). This is going to consistent 
throughout the essay. For all tables in this chapter, * corresponds to a coefficient estimate 
which is statistically significant at 10% significance level, ** corresponds to a coefficient 
estimate which is significant at 5% significance level and *** corresponds to a coefficient 
estimate which is significant at 1% significance level. This is consistent for all tables in this 
essay.
19 
 
Table 3: OLS Regression (Firm-Year Sample) 
 
  
            
        Intercept [-3.30157]*** [-3.12201]*** [-3.25344]*** [-3.17166]*** [-2.50096]*** [-2.56272]*** [-2.53393]*** 
 
0.12573 0.12859 0.1285 0.12856 0.13241 0.14448 0.17195 
PIH [-1.96166] [-1.78423] [-1.94467] [-1.64687] [-1.24911] [-1.29884] [-1.29086] 
 
1.44083 1.43918 1.44075 1.43693 1.42187 1.42878 1.42906 
MVE 
 
[-0.00002856]*** 
 
[-0.0000629]*** [-0.0000601]8*** [-0.00006032]*** [-0.00006046]*** 
  
0.00000441 
 
0.00000649 0.00000642 0.00000644 0.00000646 
NCTA 
   
0.00004627*** 0.00004468*** 0.00004329*** 0.00004331*** 
    
0.00000642 0.00000635 0.00000652 0.00000652 
NW 
    
[-2.13558]*** [-2.13777]*** [-2.13588]*** 
     
0.11713 0.11746 0.11762 
BE 
  
[-0.00001639]* 
    
   
0.00000906 
    SID 
     
0.00074856 0.00077232 
      
0.00077603 0.00077986 
HI Asset 
      
-1.08978 
       
3.52894 
R-Square 0.0001 0.0028 0.0003 0.0062 0.0272 0.0273 0.0273 
Adj R-Sq 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.006 0.0269 0.0269 0.0269 
                
        
20 
 
 
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results for the model specified in model 1 using firm-year 
observations. The dependent variable for this regression is KZ index. In column one, the 
institutional ownership has a coefficient of -1.96166 but it is not significant. When I add firm 
specific control variables, there is no changes to the result. Institutional ownership remains 
insignificant.  
In the next analysis, the observations are being divided into 2 groups; highly constrained 
firms and less constrained firms using median.  Using firm-year observations and the median 
for KZ index, there are some evidence which support hypothesis 1 where firms with higher 
institutional ownership exhibit lower financial constraint. The firms above median is 
classified as highly constrained firms and the results are presented in table 4. The results in 
table 4 are as following; institutional ownership (PIH) negatively (highly significantly) 
affects the KZ index. This evidence suggests that institutional investors (PIH) is especially 
important for firms that are highly constrained.  
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Table 4: OLS Regression (Sample of highly constrained firm using median) 
 
 
 
 
                
 
  
          Intercept 3.66627*** 3.8718*** 3.81351 3.87152*** 5.15243*** 5.15243*** 5.60186*** 6.16344*** 3.73272*** 
 
0.22342 0.23112 0.22837 0.23115 0.21677 0.21677 0.23878 0.28625 0.27034 
PIH [-11.74285]*** [-11.49836]*** -11.61112 [-11.49245]*** [-7.88307]*** [-7.88307]*** [-7.33399]*** [-6.86771]*** [-5.26004]*** 
 
2.50588 2.50467 2.50451 2.50541 2.31346 2.31346 2.32033 2.32183 2.13163 
MVE 
 
[-0.00006592]*** 
 
[-0.00006893]** -0.00003089 -0.00003089 -0.0000301 -0.00003507 
 
  
0.00001921 
 
0.00003256 0.00003005 0.00003005 0.00003009 0.00003009 
 NCTA 
   
0.00000201 -0.00001291 -0.00001291 -0.00000153 -0.00000163 -0.00001019 
    
0.00001759 0.00001623 0.00001623 0.00001645 0.00001643 0.00000914 
NW 
    
[-5.47082]*** [-5.47082]*** [-5.4495]*** [-5.42291]*** [-3.25748]*** 
     
0.16736 0.16736 0.16759 0.1676 0.16687 
BE 
  
-0.00007157 
      
   
0.00002333 
      SID 
      
[-0.00606]*** [-0.00564]*** [-0.00376]*** 
       
0.00136 0.00136 0.00125 
HI Asset 
       
[-21.77156]*** [-14.27905]*** 
        
6.13377 5.63082 
MB 
        
0.4646*** 
         
0.01385 
R-Square 0.0036 0.0055 0.0051 0.0055 0.1541 0.1541 0.1569 0.1587 0.2905 
Adj R-Sq 0.0034 0.0052 0.0048 0.005 0.1536 0.1536 0.1562 0.1578 0.2898 
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Firms with high financial constraints could attract institutional ownership through other 
mean. For example through dividend policy. Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) tax clientele 
model argue that institutions have a relative advantage to monitor firms or detect firms’ 
quality, so firms issue dividend to attract large institutions. So, it could be financial 
constraints affecting institutional ownership, and causing spurious correlation between 
institutional ownership. Next, I control for endogeneity using the whole sample (firm-year 
observation in table 3). In the first step, the dependent variable is the prior year institutional 
presence (t-1) and the independent variables are prior year KZ index (t-1). The control 
variables for institutional ownership are prior year leverage (t-1) and size (t-1). Both leverage 
and size are to control for institutional ownership.  The last row from table 5 reports the 
coefficient and the standard error for inverse Miller ratio obtained from the first step 
regression.  The Inverse Miller Ratio is going to be used in the second step regression. The 
second step is the regression of KZ index as the dependent variable with institutional 
ownership (PIH), control variables for KZ index and inverse Miller ratio as the independent 
variables. 
Even, after controlling for endogeneity, most of the coefficients for institutional ownership 
remain negative and insignificant.  Overall, results do not show support that the institutional 
ownership can mitigate financial constraint. 
23 
 
Table 5: Heckman 2 Stage Model (Firm-Year Sample) 
 
 
 
 
              
First Step 
       
        Intercept [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** 
 
0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 
KZ lag [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** 
 
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Lev lag [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** 
 
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Size lag 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 
  3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 
Second Step 
       Intercept [-9.78122]*** [-9.15855]*** [-10.09696]*** [-9.36182]*** [-9.34341]*** [-10.37803]*** [-10.27676]*** 
 
0.59675 0.67045 0.67615 0.68072 0.68044 0.73544 0.74095 
PIH 1.09461 0.91055 1.42552 1.42336 1.48422 1.51594 1.53861 
 
1.42076 1.42345 1.41983 1.41621 1.41571 1.41961 1.41973 
MVE 
 
[-0.00000892]** [-0.00004714]*** [-0.00004648]*** [-0.00006386]*** [-0.00006457]*** [-0.00006481]*** 
  
4.38E-06 0.00000606 6.05E-06 7.93E-06 7.95E-06 7.95E-06 
NCTA 
  
0.00005485*** 0.00005341*** 0.0000306*** 0.00002368** 0.00002405*** 
   
0.00000604 6.02E-06 9.03E-06 9.25E-06 9.26E-06 
NW 
   
[-1.11449]*** [-1.14128]*** [-1.14102]*** [-1.1331]*** 
    
0.13999 0.14015 0.14044 0.14062 
BE 
    
0.00008101*** 0.00009006*** 0.000089*** 
     
0.00002391 0.00002409 0.00002411 
SID 
     
0.00283*** 0.00291*** 
      
0.00077335 0.00077605 
HI Asset 
      
-3.94109 
       
3.51113 
IMR 13.25206*** 12.11738*** 13.84613*** 13.13566*** 13.11714*** 14.72638*** 14.73108*** 
 
1.18165 1.30628 1.31576 1.31543 1.31487 1.38635 1.38634 
        R2 0.0104 0.0107 0.0174 0.0225 0.0234 0.0245 0.0246*** 
Adj R2 0.0102 0.0104 0.017 0.0221 0.0229 0.0239 0.024 
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Table 6 reports the endogeniety test for highly constrained firm-year sample using the same 
Heckman’s (1979) 2 stage model. In the first stage the dependent variable is institutional 
presence regressed against the prior year KZ index, size measured using log of total asset and 
leverage measure as ratio of long term debt and total asset. The coefficient and the standard 
deviation for inverse miller ratio are reported in the last column of the table. In the second 
stage, the dependent variable is the likelihood of financially constrained firm regressed 
against institutional ownership (PIH), market value of equity (MVE), NCTA (Non cash total 
asset), NW (Net worth), BE (Book value of equity), SID (Number of segments) and 
Herfindahl Index measured using total asset (HI_Asset). For each variable, I report the 
coefficient estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in italic). After controlling for 
endogeniety, institutional ownership (PIH) negatively (highly significantly) affects KZ index. 
This evidence strengthens my previous result. This evidence suggests that institutional 
ownership (PIH) is especially important for firms that are highly constrained.  
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First Step 
       
        Intercept [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** [-2.1476]*** 
 
0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 
KZ lag [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** [-0.0022]*** 
 
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Lev lag 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 0.0427*** 
 
0.0161 0.0161 0.0161 0.0161 0.0161 0.0161 0.0161 
Size lag 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 0.3198*** 
  5.30E-03 5.30E-03 5.30E-03 5.30E-03 5.30E-03 5.30E-03 5.30E-03 
Second Step 
       Intercept [-7.07764]*** [-7.15845]*** [-7.11028]*** [-7.20538]*** [-4.49401]*** [-3.91076]*** [-3.41052]*** 
 
0.88605 0.94491 0.92852 0.94663 0.87831 0.91478 0.92238 
IO [-6.99296]*** [-6.98213]*** [-6.98625]*** [-6.92126]*** [-3.97707]* -3.78041 -3.22045 
 
2.50354 2.50412 2.50439 2.50526 2.31565 2.32241 2.32391 
MVE 
 
4.90E-06 
 
-0.00001637 0.00001408 0.00001295 0.000008 
  
1.99E-05 
 
3.25E-05 3.00E-05 3.01E-05 3.01E-05 
NCTA 
   
0.00001442 -0.00000186 0.00000469 4.66E-06 
    
1.74E-05 1.61E-05 1.63E-05 1.63E-05 
BE 
  
2.81E-06 
    
   
2.39E-05 
    NW 
    
[-5.3715]*** [-5.36206]*** [-5.33158]*** 
     
0.16588 0.16623 0.16621 
SID 
     
[-0.00368]*** [-0.00318]** 
      
0.00137 0.00137 
HI Asset 
      
[-24.05358]*** 
       
6.07895 
MB 
       
        IMR 20.13826*** 20.26113*** 20.18862*** 20.34371*** 17.67364*** 17.11147*** 17.32772*** 
 
1.60841 1.68411 1.66448 1.6871 1.56039 1.58954 1.58855 
        R2 0.0286 0.0286 0.0286 0.0287 0.1716 0.1728 0.1749 
Adj R2 0.0283 0.0282 0.0282 0.0281 0.1709 0.1719 0.1739 
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        ....Continuation from previous table 
Table 6: Heckman 2 Stage Model (Highly Constrained Firm Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
Next, I run a cross sectional regression model using firm observations. Table 7 reports the 
results from the cross sectional regression analysis. The coefficient for institutional 
ownership in column 1 is -17.8947 and significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. 
In column 2 until column 7 the coefficient for institutional ownership is -15.8710, -17.0423, -
15.8324, -10.1543, -8.5219 and -13.7986 respectively and all are significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% level of significance. Using cross sectional regression, I find that institutional ownership 
(PIH) negatively (highly significantly) affects KZ index.      
I control for endogeneity problem for this cross sectional regression analysis using the same 
Heckman’s (1979) 2 stage model. Table 8 reports the endogeniety test results for this 
analysis. In the first stage the dependent variable is institutional presence regressed against 
the prior year KZ index, size measured using log of total asset and leverage measured as the 
ratio of total long term debt and total asset. The coefficient and the standard deviation for 
inverse miller ratio are reported in the last column of the table. In the second stage, the 
dependent variable is the likelihood of firm being financially constrained and it is regressed 
against institutional ownership (PIH), market value of equity (MVE), NCTA (Non cash total 
asset), NW (Net worth), BE (Book value of equity), SID (Number of segments), Herfindahl 
Index measured using total asset (HI_Asset) and market to book ratio (MB). For each 
variable, I report the coefficient estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in italic). 
After controlling for endogeneity, the results remain consistent where institutional ownership 
(PIH) negatively (highly significantly) affects KZ index. 
28 
 
Table 7: Cross Section Regression (Firm observation) 
 
 
 
         
         Intercept [-1.93783]*** [-1.72009]*** [-1.85557]*** [-1.75562]*** [-0.82923]*** [-0.79588]*** [-0.58835]*** [-3.1444]*** 
 
0.36962 0.37516 0.37504 0.37501 0.36581 0.40526 0.4655 0.47942 
IO [-17.5441]*** [-16.60321]*** [-17.33585]*** [-16.26164]*** [-13.37701]*** [-13.13688]*** [-12.99832]*** [-12.44878]*** 
 
5.5194 5.51897 5.52119 5.51491 5.31428 5.3273 5.32965 5.17067 
MVE 
 
[-0.00005245]*** 
 
[-0.00010209]*** [-0.00009509]*** [-0.00009466]*** [-0.00009594]*** 
 
  
0.0000162 
 
0.00002435 0.00002346 0.00002349 0.00002353 
 NCTA 
   
0.00005936*** 0.00005783*** 0.0000594*** 0.0000598*** [-0.00000167]*** 
    
0.00002177 0.00002096 0.00002144 0.00002145 0.02341 
NW 
    
[-4.29766]*** [-4.29627]*** [-4.27873]*** [-1.96911]*** 
     
0.26987 0.27054 0.27124 0.00001436 
BE 
  
-0.00004067 
     
   
0.00003152 
     SID 
     
-0.00162 -0.00113 0.00236 
      
0.00457 0.0046 0.30855 
HI Asset 
      
-8.13317 -0.57065 
       
8.97481 0.00448 
MB 
       
0.3398*** 
        
8.70873 
R-Square 0.0031 0.0063 0.0036 0.0086 0.0808 0.0811 0.0813 0.1334 
Adj R-Sq 0.0028 0.0057 0.003 0.0077 0.0797 0.0797 0.0796 0.1318 
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First Step 
       
        Intercept [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** [-0.111]*** 
 
0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186 
KZ lag [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** [-0.0039]*** 
 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Lev lag 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Size lag 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 0.1061*** 
  1.05E-02 1.05E-02 1.05E-02 1.05E-02 1.05E-02 1.05E-02 1.05E-02 
Second Step 
       Intercept -20.58598 -19.59195 -20.47745 -20.00077 -18.93431 -15.48931 -16.92831 
 
19.98945 19.9743 19.99289 19.94569 19.60998 19.44403 19.57312 
IO [-24.12781]*** [-23.1327]*** [-23.73312]*** [-23.11739]*** [-19.20461]*** [-17.10722]** [-18.45709]** 
 
8.80776 8.81485 8.82179 8.80177 8.6779 8.54504 8.79212 
MVE 
 
[-0.00003291]* 
 
[-0.0000931]*** [-0.00008027]** [-0.00008693]*** [-0.00008644]*** 
  
1.81E-05 
 
3.51E-05 3.46E-05 3.44E-05 3.44E-05 
NCTA 
   
0.00005645** 0.00005334** 0.00006843** 0.00006884** 
    
2.82E-05 2.78E-05 2.96E-05 2.96E-05 
BE 
  
-2.53E-05 
    
   
3.03E-05 
    NW 
    
[-3.40104]*** [-3.46368]*** [-3.52006]*** 
     
0.56795 0.55845 0.5652 
SID 
     
-0.00291 -0.0031 
      
0.00224 0.00226 
HI Asset 
      
9.1406 
       
13.94636 
MB 
       
        IM Ratio 25.24463 25.16301 25.78243 26.13009 32.76403 27.76452 28.58776 
 
38.08079 38.03764 38.092 37.98426 37.35982 36.78811 36.82007 
        R2 0.008 0.0112 0.0087 0.0152 0.0491 0.0547 0.0551 
Adj R2 0.0061 0.0083 0.0058 0.0112 0.0443 0.049 0.0484 
                
        Table 8: Heckman 2 Stage Model (CS Firm Sample) 
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Next, I divide the full sample (firm-year observations) into 2 separate groups, highly 
constrained firms and less constrained firms. I run the analysis using probit regression where 
the dependent variable is the likelihood of being financially constraint and the results are 
presented in table 10. This table reports the probit model regression for firm sample. The 
dependent variable is the likelihood of financially constraint firm. The likelihood of 
financially constraint firm is defined when the firms’ KZ index are above median.   KZ index 
measured as following; 





−




−




++




−=
K
Cash
K
Div
TC
DebtQ
K
CFKZ *315.1*3678.39*139193.3*2826389.0*001909.1  
where CF is the cash flow, K  is the tangible asset, Q  is total investment, TC is the total 
capital, and Div is the dividend. MVE is the market value of equity, NCTA is the non-cash 
total asset, NW is net worth, BE is book value of equity, SID is the number of segments, 
HI_Asset is the Herfindahl Asset measured by total asset and MB is market to book ratio. For 
each variable, I report the coefficient estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in italics). The 
benchmark for the likelihood of being financially constrained is the median of KZ index, 
where the firms with KZ index above the median are defined as highly constrained firms and 
the firms with KZ index below the median are defined as less constrained firms.  Using the 
likelihood of highly constrained firms (Pb FC), the result is as following; institutional 
ownership (PIH) negatively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of highly 
constrained firms. The results suggest that the higher is the institutional ownership, lower is 
the likelihood of firm being financially constrained. After addressing the endogeniety 
problem in table 10, the results remain consistent. 
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        Intercept [-0.5371]*** -0.4669 [-0.5176]*** [-0.4323]*** [-0.4568]*** [-0.4169]*** [-0.5538]*** 
 
0.0456 0.0469 0.0463 0.0475 0.0521 0.0604 0.0618 
PIH [-2.0867]*** -1.7197 [-2.0234]** [-1.2419]* [-1.3305]** [-1.2958]* [-2.0744]*** 
 
0.7356 0.731 0.735 0.7268 0.7315 0.7323 0.739 
MVE 
 
-0.00002 
 
[-0.00012]*** [-0.00012]*** [-0.00012]*** 
 
  
4.90E-06 
 
0.000017 0.000017 0.000017 
 NCTA 
   
0.000069*** 0.000068*** 0.000069*** -1.52E-06 
    
0.000011 0.000011 0.000011 2.04E-06 
BE 
  
[-0.00001]*** 
    
   
5.07E-06 
    SID 
    
0.000838 0.000945 0.000237 
     
0.000614 0.00062 0.000584 
HI Asset 
     
-1.5407 -0.2865 
      
1.1878 1.1468 
MB 
      
0.00518* 
       
0.00288 
AIC 4194.374 4194.374 4194.374 4194.374 4174.394 4174.394 4174.394 
SIC 4200.456 4200.456 4200.456 4200.456 4180.471 4180.471 4180.471 
                
        Table 9: Probit Model (Financial constraint firms by median) 
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Table 10 reports the endogeniety test for probit model regression using Heckman 2 stage 
model. In the first stage, the institutional presence is regressed against the prior year KZ 
index, size is measured using log of total asset and leverage is measured as the ratio of total 
long term debt and total asset. The coefficient and the standard deviation for inverse Miller 
ratio are reported in the last column of the table. In the second stage, the dependent variable 
is the likelihood of financially constrained firm regressed against institutional ownership 
(PIH), market value of equity (MVE), NCTA (Non cash total asset), NW (Net worth), BE 
(Book value of equity), SID (Number of segments), Herfindahl Index measured using total 
asset (HI_Asset) and market to book ratio (MB). For each variable, I report the coefficient 
estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in italic). 
Next, I am going to use our previous OLS model for KZ index. But this time, I am replacing 
the institutional ownership variable with the likelihood of institutional presence to measure 
institutional investors’ presence.  I present the results in table E1 and table E2 where table E1 
is the OLS regression model using the likelihood of institutional investors’ presence and the 
latter table is the endogeniety test for this OLS regression model. Using the likelihood of firm 
with institutional presence (Pb PIH), I find that the presence of institutional investors 
negatively and highly significantly affects KZ index. After controlling for endogeniety, the 
results remain consistent. This result suggests that the presence of institutional investors is 
important for constrained firms regardless of whether it is highly constrained or less 
constrained. However, the ownership of institutional investors is especially important for 
firms that are highly constrained.  
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First Step 
        Intercept 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 
0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 0.0181 
PbFC lag [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** [-1.4049]*** 
 
0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 
Lev lag 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 0.0411 
 
0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 0.0297 
Size lag 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Second Step 
        Intercept [-1.7249]* -0.4809 -0.9529 -0.3608 -0.7286 -0.2725 0.0209 -2.0477 
 
1.0156 1.0594 1.0544 1.0493 1.1142 1.1533 1.1768 1.1729 
PIH [-33.8723]*** [-18.5341]* [-24.8755]** [-17.1258]* [-26.2294]** [-22.1809]* [-22.4841]* -42.7791 
 
11.0047 9.7052 10.7545 9.5348 13.0993 12.5518 12.6228 15.1968 
MVE 
 
[-0.0032]*** 
 
[-0.0017]** [-0.0032]*** [-0.0043]*** [-0.0043]*** 
 
  
8.00E-04 
 
9.00E-04 1.00E-03 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 
 NCTA 
   
[-0.003]** -0.0009 -0.0009 -8.00E-04 -0.0023 
    
1.30E-03 9.00E-04 1.10E-03 1.00E-03 0.0011 
BE 
  
[-0.0036]*** 
     
   
1.00E-03 
     NW 
    
[-0.6067]*** [-0.6322]*** [-0.6032]*** -0.1522 
     
0.1183 0.1317 0.1322 0.1116 
SID 
     
-0.0279 -0.0262 -0.0199 
      
0.0173 0.0169 0.0157 
HI Asset 
      
-11.3469 -4.715 
       
9.083 7.9767 
MB 
       
0.0496 
        
0.0121 
IM Ratio -1.6166 -2.0084 -1.8391 -1.9593 -1.3635 -1.4484 -1.5252 -0.045 
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1.981 2.0447 2.0523 2.0282 2.1217 2.1681 2.1837 2.1411 
         AIC 341.5526 295.9423 304.2021 288.0608 246.3568 226.6721 226.4332 223.1885 
BIC 356.3117 315.621 323.8809 312.6593 275.8749 261.0544 265.7272 262.4825 
                  
         Table 10: Heckman 2 Stage Model (Probit Model Firm Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation from previous table…… 
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Intercept [-3.3933]*** [-2.92631]*** [-3.11351]*** [-2.94719]*** [-2.76373]*** [-2.04937]*** [-1.24282]*** 
 
0.2775 0.2848 0.28305 0.28503 0.284 0.28826 0.32763 
Pb PIH -12.6954*** -12.3785*** -12.5196*** -12.3853*** -12.2080*** -10.2247*** -10.2038*** 
 
0.37129 0.37363 0.37285 0.37364 0.37217 0.37893 0.37878 
MVE 
 
[-0.000071]*** 
 
[-0.00009023]*** [-0.00008919]*** [-0.0000842]*** [-0.00008704]*** 
  
0.00000987 
 
0.00001462 0.00001455 0.00001329 0.00001329 
NCTA 
   
0.00002533* 0.00002532* 0.00004851*** 0.0000487*** 
    
0.00001421 0.00001415 0.00001326 0.00001325 
NW 
    
[-0.58198]*** [-0.5722]*** [-0.57012]*** 
     
0.03355 0.03123 0.03121 
BE 
  
[-0.00009372]*** 
    
   
0.00001884 
    SID 
     
[-0.00977]*** [-0.00907]*** 
      
0.00158 0.00158 
HI Asset 
      
[-29.86644]*** 
       
5.77533 
MB 
       
        R-Square 0.0324 0.0339 0.0331 0.0339 0.0422 0.0448 0.0457 
Adj R-Sq 0.0324 0.0338 0.0331 0.0338 0.0421 0.0446 0.0421 
                
        
Table E1 : OLS KZ index and the likelihood of institutional presence 
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First Step 
       
        Intercept [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** [-1.6634]*** 
 
0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 0.0217 
KZ lag [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** [-0.0062]*** 
 
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Lev lag [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** [-0.134]*** 
 
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Size lag 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 0.2668*** 
  3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 3.60E-03 
Second Step 
       Intercept [-41.33685]*** [-44.8741]*** [-45.22201]*** [-45.86041]*** [-44.76]*** [-38.5979]*** [-38.02167]*** 
 
0.82971 0.90036 0.89093 0.90695 0.90574 0.92038 0.93508 
Pb _IO -1.93438*** -1.7307*** -1.62765*** -1.62207*** -1.62207*** -1.33937*** -1.33795*** 
 
0.3875 0.38734 0.38741 0.38721 0.38553 0.3535 0.35341 
MVE 
 
0.00009143*** 
 
0.00001227 0.00001128 3.71E-08 -0.00000177 
  
9.13E-06 
 
1.31E-05 1.31E-05 1.09E-05 1.09E-05 
NCTA 
   
0.00010832*** 0.00010653*** 0.00007867*** 0.00007868*** 
    
1.30E-05 1.29E-05 1.10E-05 1.10E-05 
NW 
    
[-0.65296]*** [-0.68286]*** [-0.68107]*** 
     
0.04186 0.03639 0.03638 
BE 
  
0.00020144*** 
    
   
1.71E-05 
    SID 
     
0.00905*** 0.0094*** 
      
0.00138 0.00138 
HI Asset 
      
[-18.27128]*** 
       
5.27827 
IMR 78.42994*** 84.37193*** 85.06967*** 86.14918*** 84.38462*** 70.46101*** 70.29427 
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1.62619 1.72826 1.71727 1.73915 1.73526 1.71473 1.71498 
        R2 0.1051 0.1083 0.1096 0.1106 0.1184 0.1153 0.1158 
Adj R2 0.105 0.1082 0.1095 0.1105 0.1182 0.1182 0.1155 
                
        Table E2 : Endogeneity test for KZ index and the likelihood of institutional presence 
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Line of credit 
Summary Statistics for Line of Credit 
As discussed in the earlier section, the next financial constraint measurement is the line of 
credit. To be more precise, bank line of credit measures liquidity and it is an indirect 
measurement of financial constraint. According to Sufi (2009), firms which are more likely to 
have line of credit, are less likely to be constrained. Line of credit is one of the important 
sources for investment and capital. Research also shows that firms that have the history of 
getting line of credit will increase the likelihood of obtaining line of credit in the future. 
Financial networks typically include financial institutions and banks. So, institutional 
presence in a firm brings with it the ability of these institutions to arrange line of credit access 
through their networks (Fan, Subramaniam, and Ye, 2014). As discussed earlier, my second 
hypotheses is as following; firms with institutional presence and higher institutional 
ownership would exhibit higher access to bank line of credit. 
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Table 11: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit sample. The sample period spans from 1999 to 2003. 
Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of 
credit is the likelihood of obtaining line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total asset. Alternatively, Size2 measures the 
log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, NW is net worth, BE is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio. 
         Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 1038 883 0.850674 1 0.356581 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 1038 839 0.808285 1 0.39384 0 1 
PIH 
 
1038 86.46728 0.083302 0.042061 0.111516 1.67E-06 0.9724233 
Size 
 
1038 5932.11 5.71494 5.595036 1.468213 2.120943 10.539932 
Size2 
 
1038 5668.05 5.460548 5.35248 1.616671 0.714419 10.331236 
CF 
 
1038 109.0828 0.105089 0.147065 0.431419 -5.35618 1.4627892 
NW 
 
1038 451.4247 0.434899 0.469287 0.493939 -9.02247 0.9464607 
BE 
 
966 489825.2 507.0654 144.571 1977.73 1.164 28671 
MB 
 
966 3096.25 3.20523 1.528515 6.163353 -1.11772 123.28017 
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Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 106 93 0.877359 1 0.329584 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 106 89 0.839623 1 0.368699 0 1 
PIH 
 
106 13.2993 0.125465 0.077603 0.136625 0.000127 0.6205412 
Size 
 
106 565.0045 5.330232 5.154363 1.425548 2.123817 9.8110981 
Size2 
 
106 537.5262 5.071002 4.965516 1.64059 0.714419 9.8085173 
CF1 
 
106 17.05735 0.160918 0.172285 0.452341 -3.5164 1.4627892 
NW 
 
106 47.99888 0.45282 0.503228 0.349708 -2.07978 0.9133342 
BVE 
 
97 24174.19 249.2185 107.843 430.9386 4.072 2860.88 
MB 
 
97 363.0797 3.74309 1.769148 5.413153 0.774203 29.781772 
                  
Table 12: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit in year 1996 
 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit sample in year 1996. Institutional ownership or PIH is 
measured as the total shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of credit is the likelihood of obtaining 
line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total asset. Alternatively, Size2 measures the log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, 
NW is net worth, BE is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio  
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Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 126 109 0.865079 1 0.343003 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 126 103 0.81746 1 0.387831 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
126 15.6763 0.124415 0.088504 0.137436 0.000126 0.88415 
Size 
 
126 678.7354 5.386789 5.278751 1.461766 2.120943 9.8314543 
Size2 
 
126 646.0278 5.127205 4.98229 1.648535 0.739076 9.8267685 
CF1 
 
126 15.90029 0.126193 0.174144 0.406539 -2.90388 0.8684441 
NW 
 
126 57.27545 0.454567 0.476483 0.324566 -1.75501 0.9464607 
BVE 
 
114 30973.79 271.6999 111.265 576.4247 3.548 4331.88 
MB 
 
114 390.2311 3.42308 1.916594 3.704787 0.857502 21.061891 
                  
         Table 13: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit in year 1997 
 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit sample in year 1997. Institutional ownership or PIH is 
measured as the total shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of credit is the likelihood of obtaining 
line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total asset. Alternatively, Size2 measures the log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, 
NW is net worth, BE is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio. 
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         Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 117 104 0.888889 1 0.315621 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 117 97 0.82906 1 0.378076 0 1 
PIH 
 
117 16.31249 0.139423 0.093298 0.158132 2.33E-06 0.9724233 
Size 
 
117 667.9528 5.708999 5.548407 1.392509 2.735406 9.5266828 
Size2 
 
117 640.7407 5.476417 5.400251 1.544777 2.024325 9.5228126 
CF1 
 
117 15.6805 0.134021 0.163532 0.334595 -2.83186 0.757473 
NW 
 
117 56.46434 0.482601 0.471951 0.215439 -0.30926 0.9231962 
BVE 
 
108 41739.1 386.4731 137.523 874.7028 6.138 7149.73 
MB 
 
108 411.6931 3.811973 1.622188 12.00464 0.482297 123.28017 
                  
 
 
 
Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
line of credit Has line of credit, full sample 154 131 0.850649 1 0.357597 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 154 127 0.824675 1 0.381485 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
154 9.585063 0.062241 0.030051 0.090903 1.67E-06 0.6359644 
PIH 
 
154 851.1779 5.527129 5.449622 1.437721 2.626479 9.7046097 
Size2 
 
154 815.5609 5.29585 5.200599 1.592316 1.443147 9.6917784 
CF1 
 
154 13.96839 0.090704 0.14464 0.495993 -4.91863 0.7884216 
NW 
 
154 58.95117 0.3828 0.457539 0.802539 -9.02247 0.8780156 
BVE 
 
140 56560.83 404.0059 118.6355 1234.86 1.44 11722 
MB 
 
140 491.1395 3.508139 1.437358 5.829408 0.482034 35.327145 
                  
         
Table 14 and 15: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit in year 1998 and 1999 
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This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit sample in 
year 1998 and 1999. Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares held by 
institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of credit is the likelihood 
of obtaining line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total asset. 
Alternatively, Size2 measures the log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, NW is net worth, BE 
is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio. 
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        Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 157 131 0.834395 1 0.372915 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 157 128 0.815287 1 0.389307 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
157 7.40981 0.047196 0.022117 0.072108 8.06E-06 0.5083445 
Size 
 
157 884.4472 5.633421 5.540459 1.527488 2.695235 10.400316 
Size2 
 
157 848.5047 5.404488 5.250193 1.643845 1.984169 10.216289 
CF1 
 
157 16.45325 0.104798 0.145002 0.329965 -1.4487 1.3323618 
NW 
 
157 72.79493 0.463662 0.461666 0.222766 -0.24651 0.8814981 
BVE 
 
147 81138.52 551.9627 128.911 2388.09 1.164 27674 
MB 
 
147 411.6403 2.800274 1.272777 5.453729 0.152495 52.931047 
                  
 
 
Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 133 110 0.827068 1 0.379619 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 133 106 0.796993 1 0.403759 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
133 7.815344 0.058762 0.031485 0.078707 5.06E-06 0.5346972 
Size 
 
133 780.9975 5.872162 5.705261 1.482802 2.67656 10.46988 
Size2 
 
133 746.8933 5.615739 5.524544 1.615503 2.311347 10.251712 
CF1 
 
133 8.271987 0.062195 0.125955 0.349392 -2.18967 0.8234762 
NW 
 
133 62.86954 0.472703 0.470676 0.251356 -0.45561 0.8781064 
BVE 
 
126 81559.97 647.3014 189.681 2542.55 9.874 27142 
MB 
 
126 372.4721 2.956128 1.466372 4.485441 0.430938 34.993171 
                  
         Table 16 and 17: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit in year 2000 and 2001 
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This table reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit sample in 
year 2000 and 2001. Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares held by 
institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of credit is the likelihood 
of obtaining line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total asset. 
Alternatively, Size2 measures the log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, NW is net worth, BE 
is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio . 
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         Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 123 101 0.821138 1 0.384804 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 123 97 0.788618 1 0.409959 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
123 7.72747 0.062825 0.037901 0.075946 7.69E-06 0.4313238 
Size 
 
123 749.0693 6.089994 5.910832 1.405012 3.248901 10.539932 
AT2 
 
123 716.2407 5.823095 5.703716 1.543738 2.296165 10.234409 
CF1 
 
123 9.46151 0.076923 0.137338 0.501816 -4.83907 0.9827141 
NW 
 
123 54.70916 0.44479 0.447958 0.266977 -0.74379 0.8918239 
BVE 
 
117 83527.44 713.9097 205.35 2750.36 5.425 28671 
MB 
 
117 238.0103 2.034276 1.271365 3.434801 -1.11772 34.704286 
                  
         Variable Label N Sum Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lineofcredit Has line of credit, full sample 122 104 0.852459 1 0.356107 0 1 
lineofcredit_rs Has line of credit, random sample 122 92 0.754098 1 0.432396 0 1 
IO_sum 
 
122 8.641505 0.070832 0.040568 0.085471 0.000013 0.4295808 
Size 
 
122 754.7231 6.186255 5.987744 1.394411 3.211771 10.521561 
AT2 
 
122 716.5549 5.873401 5.720613 1.552195 3.015388 10.331236 
CF1 
 
122 12.28952 0.100734 0.135677 0.542091 -5.35618 0.9440941 
NW 
 
122 40.36121 0.33083 0.437273 0.89012 -8.08534 0.8896402 
BVE 
 
117 90151.31 770.524 215.814 2747.13 8.539 28039 
MB 
 
117 417.9863 3.572532 1.688567 5.593886 0.519644 44.337839 
                  
         Table 18 and 19: Summary statistics for Sufi (2009) Line of Credit in year 2002 and 2003
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Table 18 and 19 reports the summary statistics for all firms in Sufi (2009) line of credit 
sample in year 2002 and 2003. Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total shares 
held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  Line of credit is the 
likelihood of obtaining line of credit using 10-K SEC Report. Size is measured as the total 
asset. Alternatively, Size2 measures the log of total asset. CF is the cash flow, NW is net 
worth, BE is book value of equity, and MB is the market to book ratio. 
Table 12 is the total summary statistics from year 1996 until 2003 for line of credit sample. 
Since the line of credit is the likelihood of having a line of credit, the minimum and 
maximum value is 0 and 1 respectively. The mean and median for institutional ownership are 
0.0833 and 0.1115 respectively with the minimum value of 0.00000167 and the maximum 
value of 0.9724. The standard deviation for the institutional ownership is 0.1115. The firm 
characteristics variables are size, cash flow, net worth, book value of equity and market-to-
book ratio with mean of 5.7149, 0.1051, 0.4349, 507.0654 and 3.2052 respectively. The 
median and standard deviation for institutional ownership are 0.0421 and 0.1115 respectively. 
The median for size, cash flow, net worth, book value of equity and market-to-book ratio are 
5.5950, 0.1471, 0.4693, 144.571 and 1.5285 respectively. Table 12 until table 19 are the 
summary statistics for bank line of credit sample according to years to record any significant 
changes in terms of distribution over the years. On average, institutional ownership which 
records the highest value is in year 1997 with 0.1394 and the lowest value is in year 2000 
with 0.0472.  
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Table 20: Line of Credit (Probit Model) 
Intercept 0.9069*** 0.9085*** 0.9121*** 1.106*** 0.8986&*** 0.9671*** 0.7493*** 0.8785*** 0.9731*** 
 
0.0453 0.0458 0.0463 0.0568 0.0458 0.0616 0.079 0.0462 0.0618 
PIH 0.8753** 0.6928* 0.7045* 0.7* 0.8286** 0.7522** 0.7071 0.7199** 0.6856* 
 
0.4006 0.3935 0.3954 0.4029 0.4018 0.4235 0.4389 0.4023 0.4215 
CF 
 
0.39*** 0.3924*** 0.2376*** 
     
  
0.0712 0.0716 0.0655 
     MVE 
  
-1.03E-06 1.68E-07 
 
[-0.00000365]** -3.02E-06 
  
   
1.91E-06 1.97E-06 
 
2.08E-06 2.09E-06 
  MB 
   
[-0.0603]*** 
 
[-0.0614]*** [-0.0551]*** 
 
[-0.0632]*** 
    
0.0108 
 
0.0102 0.0102 
 
0.0102 
BE 
    
8.61E-06 
    
     
8.54E-06 
    SID 
     
0.00338*** 0.00326*** 
 
0.00291*** 
      
0.000589 0.000597 
 
0.000557 
HI Asset 
      
8.0991*** 
  
       
1.936 
  Size 
       
[0.000016]** 3.00E-06 
        
7.35E-06 5.78E-06 
AIC 1443.772 1443.772 1443.772 1443.772 1443.772 1438.365 1438.365 1443.772 1438.365 
SC 1449.148 1449.148 1449.148 1449.148 1449.148 1443.737 1443.737 1449.148 1443.737 
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I report the results for the probit model using (Sufi, 2009) bank line of credit sample in table 
20. The dependent variable is the likelihood of obtaining line of credit. The likelihood of 
financially constraint firm is equal to 1 when firm has access to line of credit and it is 0 when 
the firm has no access to line of credit. Institutional ownership or PIH is measured as the total 
shares held by institutional investors divided by the total shares outstanding.  MVE is the 
market value of equity, MB is the market –to-book ratio, BE is book value of equity, SID is 
the number of segments, HI_Asset is the Herfindahl Asset measured by total asset and MB is 
market to book ratio. For each variable, I report the coefficient estimate (in bold) and the 
standard error (in italic). The main result for the bank line of credit sample is presented in 
table 20. Using the likelihood of firm obtaining bank line of credit, I find that institutional 
ownership or PIH is positively related to the likelihood of firms obtaining line of credit. The 
results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. The results are also consistent 
across column after adding some control variables. Higher the likelihood of firm obtaining 
lines of credit implies higher supply of capital and indirectly it lower the financial constraints. 
In table E3, I replace the institutional ownership variable with the likelihood of institutional 
presence. The results are as following; institutional presence positively and highly 
significantly affects the likelihood of firms obtaining line of credit. The results suggest that 
both institutional ownership and presence mitigate financial constraints. 
Notes Payable 
Regression Analysis for Notes Payable  
As an addition to the analysis, I also include notes payable to measure firms’ liquidity and 
financial constraints. Notes payable is a form of short term debt used by many firms for 
capital and investment purposes.  Using the same argument in Sufi (2009), notes payable is 
another form of capital to serve the purpose to provide liquidity to the firm. So, a less 
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financially constrained firm would have more access to notes payable. So, I expect that firm 
with higher institutional ownership will have a higher access to notes payable.  
 
51 
 
                  
         Intercept 0.01174*** 0.01119*** 0.01125*** 0.01103*** 0.01172*** 0.01121*** 0.01019*** 0.01094*** 
 
0.00040819 0.00041756 0.00041681 0.00041749 0.00043417 0.00047278 0.00056238 0.00058317 
IO [-0.00813]* [-0.00867]* [-0.00831]* [-0.00823]* [-0.00783]* [-0.00883]* [-0.00911]* [-0.00947]* 
 
0.00468 0.00467 0.00467 0.00467 0.00466 0.00467 0.00467 0.00467 
MVE 
 
0.0000*** 
 
-2.28E-08 -2.01E-08 -2.18E-08 -1.69E-08 
 
  
1.43E-08 
 
2.11E-08 2.11E-08 2.11E-08 2.11E-08 
 NCTA 
   
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
    
2.08E-08 2.08E-08 2.1342E-08 2.13E-08 1.50E-08 
NW 
    
[-0.00217]*** [-0.00219]*** [-0.00226]*** [-0.00297]*** 
     
0.00038395 0.00038423 0.00038463 0.00041101 
BE 
  
0.0000*** 
     
   
2.94E-08 
     SID 
     
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 
      
0.00000254 0.00000255 0.00000255 
HI Asset 
      
0.03861*** 0.03716*** 
       
0.01154 0.01151 
MB 
       
[-0.00013624]*** 
        
0.0000283 
R-
Square 0.0002 0.0026 0.0023 0.0058 0.0079 0.0084 0.0092 0.0106 
Adj R-
Sq 0.0001 0.0024 0.0022 0.0056 0.0076 0.0081 0.0088 0.0102 
                  
         Table 21: OLS Regression with Notes Payable (Firm-Year Sample) 
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          Intercept 1.4893*** 1.2154*** 1.2154*** 1.4858*** 0.9575*** 1.26*** 0.9211*** 0.9177*** 1.1372*** 
 
0.0157 0.0799 0.08 0.0887 0.0732 0.0926 0.1094 0.0737 0.0896 
Pb PIH 0.1164* 0.4003*** 0.4004*** 0.4479*** 0.5835*** 0.3361*** 0.2923*** 0.528*** 0.4298*** 
 
0.0689 0.1049 0.1054 0.108 0.0999 0.1093 0.11 0.1007 0.1062 
CF 
 
0.0774*** 0.0774*** 0.0582*** 
 
[-0.00000547]*** 0.0477*** 
  
  
0.00789 0.00791 0.00801 
 
3.98E-06 0.00788 
  MVE 
  
-2.93E-08 1.96E-06 
 
-5.47E-06 -3.95E-06 
  
   
3.73E-06 3.85E-06 
 
3.98E-06 4.00E-06 
  MB 
   
[-0.108]*** 
 
[-0.0936]*** [-0.0859]*** 
 
[-0.1089]*** 
    
0.0143 
 
0.014 0.0136 
 
0.0132 
BE 
    
0.000059** 
    
     
2.50E-05 
    SID 
     
0.00752*** 0.00709*** 
 
0.00726*** 
      
0.00117 0.00116 
 
0.00118 
HI Asset 
      
15.2321*** 
  
       
2.9149 
  Size 
       
0.000092*** 0.000048** 
        
2.20E-05 1.90E-05 
AIC 27084.207 2420.321 2422.321 2345.056 2345.056 2268.038 2233.988 2527.615 2314.106 
SC 27100.718 2437.852 2445.696 2374.276 2445.696 2303.082 2274.873 2545.146 2343.309 
                    
          Table E3: Probit Model Line of Credit and the likelihood of instituional presence 
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In table 21, I report the result for ordinary least square regression for firm-year sample. The 
dependent variable is notes payable. Notes payable is divided by total asset to control for firm 
size. The independent variables are market value of equity (MVE), non-cash total asset 
(NCTA), net worth (NW), book value of equity (BE), number of segments (SID), and 
Herfindahl Index (HI_Asset) measured using total asset and market-to-book ratio (MB). For 
each variable, I report the coefficient estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in italics). 
Using notes payable as the measurement for liquidity and financial constraint, I find that 
institutional ownership is negatively related to institutional ownership. However, I find that 
the coefficient estimates are only significant at 10% level of significance. So, institutional 
ownership negatively and weakly significantly affect institutional ownership. The evidence 
suggest that institutional ownership lowers the likelihood of firm obtaining notes payable 
which contradicts the hypotheses. The contradiction might be contributed by the fact that 
notes payable is a form of short term debt and it may simply reflect that debt is due in one 
year for  majority of the firms.  So, this suggests that notes payable may not be a good 
indicator of financial constraint. 
Next, I assign the likelihood of firm with high notes payable using median as the benchmark. 
The likelihood of firm with high notes payable is equal to 1 if firm has high notes payable 
and 0 if firm has low notes payable. Firms with high notes payable are known as less 
constrained firms because they have more access to capital in term of short term debts. Using 
the likelihood of firm of firm with high notes payable as the dependent variable, I find that 
institutional ownership (PIH) is positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of 
notes payable. This is consistent with the results using bank line of credit data. The evidence 
suggests that higher the likelihood of firm with high notes payable implies higher supply of 
capital. With high supply of capital in the firm, it indirectly implies lower financial 
constraint.  
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         Intercept [-1.1545]*** [-1.3319]*** [-1.338]*** [-1.3784]*** [-1.3945]*** [-1.5727]*** [-1.7444]*** [-1.292]*** 
 
0.022 0.0237 0.0238 0.0241 0.0259 0.0287 0.0339 0.0473 
PIH 1.573*** 1.4779*** 1.5111*** 1.4552*** 1.4506*** 1.2456*** 1.212*** 1.1679*** 
 
0.2341 0.2377 0.2374 0.2388 0.239 0.2437 0.2463 0.2486 
MVE 
 
0.000027*** 
 
0.000005969*** 0.000005888*** 0.000006451*** 0.000007361*** 
 
  
1.34E-06 
 
1.76E-06 1.76E-06 1.76E-06 1.78E-06 
 NCTA 
   
0.000036*** 0.000036*** 0.000024*** 0.000025*** 0.000032*** 
    
2.78E-06 2.78E-06 2.73E-06 2.76E-06 1.90E-06 
NW 
    
0.0487*** 0.0389 0.0268 [-0.239]*** 
     
0.0274 0.0278 0.0274 0.0356 
BE 
  
0.000065*** 
     
   
3.21E-06 
     SID 
     
0.00241*** 0.0023*** 
 
      
0.000137 0.000137 
 HI Asset 
      
6.064*** 
 
       
0.6074 
 MB 
       
[-0.128]*** 
        
0.0113 
AIC 17406.201 16642.564 16627.846 16423.485 16421.829 16043.105 15946.787 15751.965 
SIC 17421.485 16665.49 16650.772 16454.052 16460.039 16088.923 16000.242 15805.42 
                  
         Table 22: Probit Model with Notes Payable (Firm-Year Sample by Median) 
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The table above reports the probit model for firm-year sample with notes payable. The 
dependent variable is the likelihood of obtaining notes payable. The likelihood of obtaining 
notes payable is equal to 1 when notes payable is above median and equal to 0 when notes 
payable is below median. The independent variables are market value of equity (MVE), non-
cash total asset (NCTA), net worth (NW), book value of equity (BE), number of segments 
(SID), and Herfindahl Index (HI_Asset) measured using total asset and market-to-book ratio 
(MB). For each variable, I report the coefficient estimate (in bold) and the standard error (in 
italics). 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Using KZ index (LPS, 2001) as the financial constraint measurement and bank line of credit 
(Sufi, 2009) as liquidity measurement, I find evidence which support the hypotheses that 
firms with institutional presence and higher institutional ownership exhibit lower KZ index. I 
find that firms with institutional investors’ presence and higher institutional ownership 
exhibit lower KZ index. While institutional presence mitigates financial constraint, the 
importance of institutional ownership is more evident for highly constrained firms. After 
redefining the sample into a group of highly constrained and less constrained firms using 
median as the benchmark, I find that institutional ownership negatively and highly 
significantly affects KZ index. The results appear to be consistent even after controlling for 
endogeneity. Using the second financial constraint measurement, which is line of credit (Sufi, 
2009), I find firms with institutional presence and higher institutional ownership exhibit 
higher access to bank line of credit. Since institutional investors are financial institution 
themselves, their presence can benefit the firm in terms of obtaining line of credit which 
mitigates the financial constraint condition in a firm.  
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This research can be extended by examining the impact of institutional presence in the long 
run. In the long run, not only the presence of institutional investors may provide the firm with 
more access to capital and different sources of capital but institutional investors may benefit 
the firm via monitoring.    
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Chapter 2 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Institutional investors’ share ownership has increased significantly over the past decades 
through funds like pension and mutual funds. This makes institutional investors one of the 
largest shareholders in publicly traded firms. The role of institutional investors has been 
investigated by many researchers. As has been noted, institutional investors play an important 
role in monitoring the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Maug, 1998). Institutional investors 
are also known to be better informed compared to individual investors (Gomper and Metrick, 
2001). Given different focus and objectives, researchers have classified institutional investors 
into short term and long term institutional investors.  Bushee (1998, 2001) has classified 
institutional investors into 3 categories, the transient investor (short term investor), quasi-
indexer, and dedicated investors (the last 2 categories are classified as long term investors). 
Bushee (2004) summarizes that transient investors are investors who exhibit high portfolio 
turnover, high liquidity and have good past performance in terms of stock return and 
earnings. Quasi-indexer investors are infrequent traders, own small stakes in a company and 
prefer large and mature firms with low risk. Dedicated investors also show similar preference 
for mature and low risk firms and provide stability in individual firms.  
There are some theories which suggest reasons why ownership structure and payout policy 
might be related. The free cash flow theory by Jensen (1986) asserts that with enhanced 
monitoring, firms are more likely to pay out their free cash flow. This is then followed by 
Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) who suggest that institutional investors prefer dividends 
due to prudent-man rule and because of the comparative tax advantage that they will gain in 
receiving dividends. Since institutional investors are better informed, they can provide 
monitoring role for the firm.   
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In another model by Brennan and Thakor (1990), given adverse selection problems, this 
might lead uninformed investors (individual investors) to prefer dividends over share 
repurchases. However, large and informed investors (institutional investors), because they are 
more informed compared to individual investors, prefer share repurchases.  
I wish to argue that since long term investors stay longer in a firm, they focus more on 
their monitoring role compared to trading activity. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find evidence 
that long term institutional investors focus more on its monitoring role compared to trading 
activity. From Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) ownership clientele model, firms issue 
dividend to attract institutions because of their ability to monitor. This suggests that the firm 
might attract long term institutional investors because they focus more on their monitoring 
role.   
However, Brennan and Thakor (1990) assert that informed trader (institutional investors) 
can benefit from share repurchase by selling stocks when stocks are overvalued. Since long 
term institutional investor stay longer in the firm to exert influence to the management, they 
are unlikely to participate in selling their shares because of the ownership. While short term 
investors focus more on gaining short term profit and not ownership, they are more likely to 
benefit from selling their shares. So, short term institutional investors are more likely to 
prefer share repurchase. Bushee (2001) finds evidence which suggests that short term 
investors focus more on short term gain.   
So in this paper, I wish to investigate the relationship between different types of institutional 
investors which have different investment agenda, horizon and payout policy. Prior literature 
has examined the relationship between payout policy, individual investors and institutional 
investors, but no research has investigated whether certain type of payout policy is related to 
certain type of institutional investors. Brennan and Thakor (1990) investigate the relationship 
between institutional investors and individual investors with certain types of
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payout which are share repurchases but they did not specify the type of institutional investors. 
Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) also looked into the relationship between institutional 
investors in general but investigates only dividend as the method of payout policy. Both 
findings suggest there is a relationship between institutional investors and payout policy. 
Another contribution that can be made in this research is by taking into account both share 
repurchase and dividend as the method of payout policy and not restricted to only one type of 
payout policy.  
With the findings, firms are able to attract and identify which type of institutional investors 
they want in their firm. Since institutional investors play a vital role in the firm, it is 
important to be able to distinguish and identify the types of institutional investors firms are 
attracting. This is especially important for firms which require monitoring.  
  The findings of my research will also indirectly contribute to the literature on impact of 
institutional investors’. As mentioned earlier, institutional investors have gained much 
importance not only in corporate finance but in other fields such as investment due to the 
significant increase in firm participation by institutional investors. From the findings, I hope 
that we can further understand how specific type of institutional investors behave or affect 
firms’ policy. By recognizing whether certain type of payout policy is related to certain type 
of institutional investors, hopefully firms are able to make payout policy decisions which are 
aligned with firms’ objectives.  
Brennan and Thakor (1990) argue from information asymmetry point of view where 
institutional investors are better informed compared to individual investors. On the other 
hand, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) argue from monitoring role played by institutional 
investors’ point of view. Both find that institutional investors are related to payout policy 
(share repurchases and dividends) respectively. The findings in this research can interlink 
between both theories and findings for better understanding regarding payout policy 
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decisions in a firm. We can also link it between the permanent nature of dividend and the 
flexible nature of share repurchases with institutional investors. Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) find that dividends are paid and used by firms with higher permanent 
operating cash flows while share repurchases are paid by firms with higher temporary non-
operating cash flows.  
At the end of this research, the findings can also help to answer how informative dividend 
or share repurchases announcements are after controlling for observables. Institutional 
investors not only play a role in monitoring, but also they have information advantage 
(Demiralp et al, 2011). They have the accessibility to databases and are able to hire analyst to 
monitor firms’ performance compared to individual investors.  O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) 
find that analyst and institutional investors in a firm are related. In this paper, they argue that 
institutional investors motivates analyst to follow firms.  Healy and Palepu (1992) find 
positive earnings changes when a firm initiate dividend while there is evidence that firms 
which omit dividends has negative earnings subsequent to the announcement. This suggest 
that issuing dividend signals that firm is doing well and in contrast omitting dividend signals 
bad news for the firm.   
    In section 2.2, I will be discussing the literature reviews related to my questions. In 
section 2.3, I derive the hypothesis and the empirical predictions. In section 2.4, I will be 
presenting the methodology, section 2.5 describes the data and the sources and section 2.6 I 
present the results for my analysis.  
  
2.2Literature reviews 
There is no direct theory or model which suggests the relationship between certain 
classification of institutional investors and certain type of payout policy. However, there is 
empirical evidence which links institutional investors and payout policy, institutional 
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investors and monitoring theory, and monitoring theory and payout policy. I will discuss 
findings by previous researchers that link institutional investors and payout policy, 
institutional investors and monitoring, and monitoring and payout policy. I will end the 
discussion with literature which discusses types of institutional investors and their objectives. 
 
Institutional investors and payout policy 
 
Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) tax clientele model argue that institutions have a relative 
advantage to monitor firms or to detect firms’ quality, so firms issue dividend to attract large 
institutions. This is due to comparative tax advantages that institutions will gain for 
dividends.   
One competing theory which predicts different outcomes is Brennan and Thakor 
(1990). Using the adverse selection model, they argue that large share institutions prefer 
share repurchases compared to dividends. In the model, they assume that large institutions 
(institutional investors) are more informed compared to small shareholders (individual 
investors). So, institutional investors will take advantage by tendering offer when the share 
repurchase price is too high and will bid when the share repurchases is low. Since individual 
investors will participate indiscriminately, as a result, they will be left with a large portion of 
share in the firm when the repurchase price is too high and small portion of share when the 
repurchase price is too low. They argue that share repurchases activity is associated with the 
distribution of wealth between the large institution and small shareholders.  
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine the relationship between institutional holdings and 
payout policy in US public firms and find that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares 
and regular repurchases over non-regular repurchases. They also find that higher institutional 
holdings do not increase firms’ payout policy. Jain (2007) examines institutional and 
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individual preference for dividends and share repurchases. He finds that institutional 
investors prefer firms that engage in large repurchases while individual investors do not 
prefer share repurchases. These findings are consistent with the adverse selection model in 
Brennan and Thakor (1990).  
Given mixed evidences to support both theories, this might suggest that there could be 
different type of institutional investors which have preferences for different type of payout 
policy that drives these different results. 
 
Institutional Investors and Monitoring 
 
Some of theoretical works which look into the role of institutional investors and monitoring 
are by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). They argue that large shareholders can increase the value 
of the firm by monitoring the firm which provides partial solution for the free-rider problem. 
They also consider the possibility of the differential valuation of shares by individual and 
institutional investors in the presence of dividend taxes and capital gains. They argue that 
since institutional investors can enjoy the tax benefits, they would prefer dividend as their 
payout while individual investors are optimal when there is no dividend being paid. 
Maug (1998) examine the incentives of institutional investors to monitor public 
corporation. Maug (1998) investigates 2 views on the impact of market liquidity towards the 
benefits of monitoring for institutional investors. The first view is that liquidity will reduce 
the monitoring benefits for large shareholders because they are able to sell their stocks easily. 
The second view is that market liquidity will make it less costly to hold larger stakes in firm 
and it will be easier for institutional investors to buy additional shares. They find that market 
liquidity is beneficial because they make corporate governance more efficient. 
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Some of empirical evidences on the role of institutional investors on monitoring are as 
following. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find evidence for active monitoring hypothesis 
which is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Demiralp et al (2011) find evidence on 
the monitoring benefits from institutional investors by examining the relationship between 
institutional ownership and stock price and operating performances following seasoned 
equity offerings. They find that announcement returns are positive and significantly related to 
active institutional investors’ level and concentration.  
 
Interconnection between Monitoring Theory and Payout Policy 
 
Gugler (2003) investigates the relationship between dividends payout policy and the 
ownership and control structure of the firm. The author finds that state controlled firms 
participate in dividend smoothing activity while family controlled firms do not. There is 
evidence that family controlled firms chooses lower target payout ratio. Consistent with this 
result, they also find that state controlled firms are most hesitant when it comes to cut 
dividends while the family controlled firms are least hesitant to cut dividend when they are in 
the situation where cuts are warranted. Banks and foreign controlled firm exhibit dividend 
behaviour which is in between state controlled firms and family controlled firms.   
Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994) investigate the monitoring explanation for 
controlling agency costs using Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982) framework. They 
investigate the monitoring mechanism by examining regulated electric utility industry to find 
industry effect. They argue that if there is monitoring mechanism in issuing dividend, it 
should be more evident in the utility industry compared to other industrial firms. Their 
argument is that utility stockholders have the added need to obtain monitoring of the 
regulators. They find evidence to support the monitoring mechanism where firms use 
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dividend-equity financing to overcome stockholder-regulators and stockholders-managers 
conflict.     
In Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) model, they also include the monitoring role 
played by capital market players to reduce agency cost which we have discussed earlier. 
 
Types of institutional investors and their role 
Most literatures on institutional investors focus on their monitoring role and its benefits. 
Then, researchers identify that there exist different types of institutional investors. In one of 
his earlier work, Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investor as transient, quasi-indexer and 
dedicated investors. In this paper, he examines whether institutional investors create or 
reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development 
to meet short term earning. He finds evidence that short term institutional investors engage in 
momentum trading and are involved with firms which have high turnover ratio. While other 
institutional investors play a role in monitoring by putting pressure in managers to reduce 
myopic behaviour. Since then, he has been developing institutional investor classification 
data which is now available via website.  
Woidtke (2002) examines the valuation effects associated with the incentives structures of 
different types of institutional investors using ownership variable. She finds that valuation 
effect vary according to the objective functions of institution administrators. Yan and Zhang 
(2009) argue that institutional investors are heterogeneous. They have different investment 
horizon due to the differences in their investment objective. Kahn and Winton (1998) 
examine the role of institutional investors in trading and monitoring. They show how these 2 
roles can be connected to each other. They show that institutional investors’ decision to 
monitor not only depends on the direct benefit they obtain from monitoring but also the 
impact of monitoring on the institutions trading profits.  
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By classifying the institutional investors, this has spark interest in many researchers to 
study the roles of short term and long term institutional investors. Chen, Hartford and Li 
(2007) using the cost benefit framework, find evidence that long term investors focus on 
monitoring activity rather than trading activity. They suggest that the long term institutional 
investors make long term portfolio adjustment and only sell in advance if the firm is very 
bad. In his later paper, Bushee (2001) examines whether certain type of institutional investors 
show preferences towards short run earnings compared to long run earnings. He finds that 
transient investors are positively (negatively) related to short term (long term) earnings. This 
evidence suggests that short term institutional investor’s focus on short term gain and trading 
compared to monitoring activities. Yan and Zhang (2009) find evidence that positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and future stock return are mainly driven by 
short term institution investors.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
  
Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors as transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated 
investors. Transient investors or short term institutional investors are investors who prefer 
companies with high liquidity and high portfolio turnover. This type of investors will focus 
more on trading for short term profit (Bushee, 2001). The quasi indexer investors are 
investors who prefer firms with low share turnover and they focus on long horizon with buy 
and hold type of investment strategy. Dedicated investors or long term institutional investors 
are long term investors who provide stability in the firm and they prefer firms with low 
portfolio turnover. Dedicated investors are known to play the monitoring role in the firm and 
usually stay in the firm longer. By staying longer in the firm, dedicated institutional investors 
are able to exert influence in the management.  
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In the payout policy literatures, there are 2 competing theories which are related to payout 
policy and institutional investor. From Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) ownership clientele 
model, firms issue dividend to attract institutional investors because of their role to monitor. 
This suggests that the firm might attract long term institutional investors because institutional 
investors are more likely to engage in monitoring role compared to short term institutional 
investors. So far, there is lack of empirical evidence which supports the theory that firms pay 
dividend to attract institutional investors for monitoring. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find 
little evidence which support Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) ownership clientele model 
and concludes that examining the institutional investors as a whole has little effect on 
dividend policy. They suggest that by looking at a small number of institutional investors 
(which are strong monitors) might have an affect towards dividend policy.  I argue that firms 
which issue dividends are more likely to be associated with long term institutional investors.  
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) also find evidence that firms which pay 
dividends are linked to higher permanent operating cash flow and the nature of dividend 
payments are steady and increases over time. The dividend increment is also followed by 
good performance in the firm. These firm characteristics might be associated with the 
benefits of monitoring role played by the long term institutional investors. The ability to 
distinguish which type of institutional investors is beneficial to the firm since institutional 
investors plays a vital role in the firm. 
So, my first hypotheses is as following; firms with higher percentage of long term 
institutional investors and the likelihood of having long term institutional investors are 
positively related to the likelihood of firm paying dividend and the magnitude of dividend 
because long term institutional investors focus on monitoring and not trading for short term 
profit. 
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However, according to Brennan and Thakor (1990), institutional investors are more likely 
to sell when stock is overvalued. The focus of long term institutional investors is to monitor 
and to provide stable ownership. So, they are unlikely to participate in selling their shares. 
Since short term institutional investors are frequent traders and focus on short term profit, the 
adverse selection model in Brennan and Thakor (1990) is more likely to benefit and fit the 
focus of short term institutional investors, not the long term institutional investors. Bushee 
(2001) finds evidence that short term investors are more interested in short term earning 
compared to long term earnings. Lowenstein (1988) asserts that the objective and focus for 
short term performance leads to more aggressive strategies (such as market timing) at the 
expense of buy and hold investment strategies. This suggests that short term investors are 
more interested in trading for short term profit. In a survey, Brav et al (2008), find that 
managers favour share repurchases because share repurchases are viewed as being more 
flexible compared to dividend and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market. This is 
also consistent with short term institutional investors because they are more likely to 
participate in market timing compared to long term institutional investor who is more likely 
to stay longer in the firm and monitor the firm performance. Jagannathan, Stephens and 
Weisbach (2000) also find evidence that firms which pay share repurchases are linked to 
higher temporary non-operating cash flow and have a much more volatile cash flows and 
distributions. These firm characteristics are more likely to be associated with the 
characteristics of short term institutional investors. 
This led us to my second hypotheses;  firms with higher percentage of short term institutional 
investors and the likelihood of having short term institutional investors are positively related 
to the likelihood of firms undertaking share repurchases and the magnitude of share 
repurchases because short term institutional investors focus on trading and not monitoring. 
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2.4. Methodology 
 
To test the hypotheses, I am using a probit regression type of model and the models are as 
following; 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) titititititititi LEVMBCENOISizeTraPbDedPbDivPb ,7,6,5,4,3,2,1, βββββββα +++++++=
Model 1 
where  
( ) =DivPb Probability of firm issuing dividend, 
( ) =DedPb Indicator variables for presence of dedicated institutional investors, 
( ) =TraPb Indicator variables for presence of transient institutional investors, 
=Size Firm Size, 
=NOI Non-operating income, 
=CE Capital expenditures, 
=MB Market to book ratio. 
 
Model 1 is limited to investigate whether the nature of payout is related to the type of 
institutional investor where it is limited to measure only the presence of institutional 
investors.  
The following models are taking into account the magnitude of ownership with different 
types of institutional investors and the magnitude of payout. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) titititititititi LevMBCENOISizeDedPIHTraPIHDivPb ,7,6,5,4,3,2,1, βββββββα +++++++=
Model 2 
 where  
( ) =TraPIH Ownership for transient institutional investors, 
( ) =DedPIH Ownership for dedicated institutional investors. 
 
In the third model, I am taking into account the magnitude of dividend or the dividend yield. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
titi
titititititititi
LevMB
CENOISizeDedPIHTraPIHDedPbTraPbDY
,9,8
,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,
ββ
βββββββα
+
++++++++=


Model 3 
where  
=DY Dividend yield. 
 
In the fourth model I am taking into the magnitude of share repurchases. 
( ) MBLEVSIZECENOIDedPbTraPbSP tititititititi 9,8,7,6,5,2,1, )( βββββββα +++++++=
Model 4 
 
where 
SP = share repurchases, 
=Size Firm Size, 
=NOI Non-operating income, 
=CE Capital expenditures, 
=MB Market to book ratio, 
=Debt Leverage. 
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I am also taking into account the likelihood of firms issuing share repurchases as the 
dependent variable. 
( ) titititititititi LEVMBCENOISizeDedPbTraPbSPPb ,7,6,5,4,3,2,1, )()( βββββββα +++++++=
Model 5 
 
where  
( ) ==1SPPb If firm is issuing share repurchases, 
( ) == 0SPPb  If firm is not issuing share repurchases. 
 
To take into account firms that issue both dividend and share repurchases, I am using the 
following model, 
( ) ( )
.
)_(_
,7,6
,5,4,3,2,1,
titi
titititiktikti
LEVMB
CENOISizeTypePIHTypePbSPDPb
ββ
βββββα
+
++++++=


Model 6 
 
where 
( ) =SPDPb __ Probability of dividend and share repurchases according to rank, 
( ) =TypePb Probability of certain type k institutional investor, 
( ) =TypePIH Ownership of certain type k  institutional investor, 
=k Transient or dedicated institutional investor.  
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Endogeniety issue 
Endogenous self-selection model and Heckman’s (1979) approach 
There are possibilities that firms’ decision to issue dividend or share repurchases can affect 
the types of institutional ownership. We are looking into possibilities that the presence of 
certain type of institutional investors motivates firms to choose certain type of payout policy. 
Specific type of institutions can self-select into firms based on whether they pay dividends or 
undertake share repurchases. So, payout policy can affect the types of institutional investors 
in a firm. In this case, there is a potential endogeneity issue which might arise in this 
research. To address this problem, I am using the endogenous self-selection model and 
Heckman’s (1997) model. 
The first stage model is as following,  
( ) 1,1,1, −−− ++= tiitiiiti PPRmL γβα  
where 
=L Institutional investor type indicator, 
 (where =m 0 if there is no dedicated or transient institutional presence, =m 1 if there is 
dedicated or transient institutional presence)   
=R Control variable for institutional investors, 
PP =payout policy variables . 
From the first stage model, I obtain the Inverse Mills ratio and use it in the second stage 
model. 
The second stage model is as following, 
titititi IMYIIPP ,,,0, +++=σ   
where  
=II Type of institutional investors variables, 
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=Y Control variables for payout policy variables, 
=IM Inverse Miller ratio from the first stage model. 
 
2.5 Data 
 
I am considering 3 samples for the analysis. The first sample is the dividend and non-
dividend paying firms. The second sample is the share repurchases and non-share repurchases 
paying firms and the third sample consist of firms which issue both dividend and share 
repurchases. The study period spans from 1981 until 2010. 
 
Ownership data 
 
Following Bushee’s (1998, 2001) method of classifying institutional investors based on their 
observed investment and trading behaviour, institutional investors will be categorized as 
transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated investors. Institutional investor classification data from 
1981 to 2010 can be obtained from Bushee website. To calculate the percentage ownership 
by each type of institution in each firm, the classification data has to be merged with the 
spectrum database from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database 
(previously known as Spectrum). According to SEC regulation, they require all institutional 
investors with investment discretion over portfolios exceeding $100 million in equity 
securities to report their holdings in 13(f) filings at the end of each quarter. In the institutional 
investor classification data, spectrum manager number is the fund manager number used in 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. For the manager number version, 
Bushee assigns a new version of number every time there is more than 2 quarter break in 
holdings information for a manager number. This is done because (13F) database recycles 
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manager numbers. Bushee also provides updated permanent key to allow researcher to merge 
13F data with any mutual fund data. Previously, Spectrum provided this variable but recently 
they discontinue providing the permanent key. Year is denoted as the calendar year of the 
classification. In classifying the institutions, he computes averages across the four holdings 
reports for each calendar year. The legal type of institutional investor which are available are 
the bank trust (BNK), insurance company (INS), investment company (INV), independent 
investment advisor (IIA), corporate (private) pension fund (CPS), public pension fund (PPS), 
university and foundation endowment (UFE) and miscellaneous (MSC). Each is assigned 
with specific Spectrum type code. BNK, INS, INV, IIA, CPS, PPS, UFE and MSC are 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 5, 5, and 5 respectively. The type code has also been updated. For new institution, he 
assigns a type code based on searches for information about the fund manager. In his 
research, type 3 is merged into one group. For different types of institutional investors, the 
following codes are used, dedicated (DED), quasi-indexer (QIX) and transient (TRA). This 
classification scheme is different from Bushee (1998) paper because the momentum variables 
are eliminated. He also extends this classification by applying the factor loadings reported in 
the earlier papers (Bushee, 2001, Bushee and Noe, 2001) to more recent data to compute 
factor scores. For data which has no classification, there are 3 possibilities. The first 
possibility is that the data could be missing. The second possibility is that the fund has a 
small portfolio (e.g. there are fewer than 4 stocks available in the CRSP and Compustat data). 
The third possibility could be due to the fact that the fund has not been listed on Spectrum for 
more than 2 years.  
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Dividend and Share Repurchases events data 
Dividend events can be obtained via Compustat. Compustat provides the ratio of gross annual 
cash dividends per share in $ during the year (Compustat Data Item 26). CRSP/Compustat 
merged database also records security monthly dividend event. Alternatively, I am also 
considering data set from CRSP where we can obtain the list of firms with dividend return 
and without dividend return.  
 I use 3 different methods to measure share repurchases. For the first method, I use purchases 
of common stock (Compustat Item #115) by Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000). 
For the second method, I use tender offer measurement by Jain (2007). For share repurchases 
events, we can identify firms which issue share repurchases via tender offers with distribution 
codes 6261 and 6561. For the third method, I use open share repurchases measurement. For 
open market share repurchases, I use Stephens and Weisbach (1998) method of measuring 
share repurchases. We are able to identify share repurchases events via open market by first 
identifying non-share repurchases activities such as stock splits, dividend reinvestment plan 
and tender offer activities. Then by eliminating the non-share repurchases events and share 
repurchases events via tender offer, the sample represents the share repurchases events via 
open market.  
 
Control variables 
Firm size is measured as the book value of total asset (Compustat item #6) following 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000). Alternatively, it can be measured as the market 
value of common equity at the end of each year (CRSP) or log market value of equity 
following Jain (2007) and Bushee (2001). This is to control for the size of firm where large 
size firms have the ability to issue higher dividends and share repurchases compared to small 
size firms. Operating income is the average ratio of operating income (Compustat item #13) 
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to total asset (Compustat item #6) following Jagannathan, Stephens and Wiesbach (2000) or 
JSW (2000). A firm with higher income has the ability to pay out more than lower income 
firm. The same applied to the non-operating income. The non-operating income is the 
average ratio of non-operating income (Compustat item #61) to total asset (Compustat item 
#6) following JSW (2000). Standard deviation of operating income is the standard deviation 
of the ratio of operating income to total assets. Lagged dividend payout ratio is the prior 
year’s ratio of total dividends (Compustat item #21) to net income available to common 
shareholders (Compustat item #237). Market to book ratio is the proxy for investment 
opportunity where it is measured as the average ratio of the market value of equity given by 
the year end price per share (Compustat item #24) multiply by the number of shares 
outstanding (Compustat item #25) to the book value of equity (Compustat item #62) 
following JSW (2000). If the market to book value for a firm is higher, this increases the 
firms’ ability to payout.  The debt ratio is the average ratio of long term debt (Compustat item 
#9) to total asset (Compustat item #6) following Jaganathan et al (2000). If the firm is highly 
leveraged, this increases the ability for the firm to payout.  Capital expenditures is the 
average ratio of capital expenditures (Compustat item #128) to total asset (Compustat item 
#6) following JSW (2000).  
 
Other issues (Tax Law Changes) 
In 2003, US congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. In this act, 
dividends are taxed at the same rate with capital gains. For individuals, the statutory dividend 
tax rate drop from 38.6% to 15%. At the same time, capital gain tax also decreases from 20% 
to 15%. The cut on tax rate provides researchers a good opportunity to test on tax effect on 
dividend and share repurchases. The dividend tax cut in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act in 2003 has a significant effect towards payout policy. Post 2003, there 
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are significant evidences which shows that dividend activity increases. Blouin, Raedy and 
Shackelford (2011) find evidence that insiders such as directors and managers rebalance their 
portfolio to benefit from the tax cut. However, they find no evidence individual investors 
rebalance their portfolio post tax cut. They also find evidence that firms with large individual 
ownership increase the dividend portion of their payout.  Chetty and Saez (2004) find 
evidence a 20% increase in dividend payments by nonfinancial and nonutility publicly traded 
corporation after the tax cut. There is also evidence of a large number of firms initiating 
dividends. As a result, the number of firms issuing dividend post 2003 increases after we 
have seen a decline in dividend payments for the past few years. The authors find that 
strongest effect on tax cut comes from firms which are affected most by the tax cut such as 
large taxable institutional owners and independent directors with large shareholdings. For 
firms with large non-taxable financial institution, they find that these firms do not change 
their payout policy.   
Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007) test whether the 2003 dividend tax cut has any 
implications on the dividends by examining the changes of dividend from the perspective of 
executive stock ownership. Executive with higher ownership are more likely to increase 
dividends after the tax cut which occur in 2003. There is also evidence of substitution effect 
between share repurchases and dividend. The authors find evidence that firms which initiated 
dividends in 2003 are more likely to reduce share repurchases. 
 One way to control for this effect is to divide that data into 2 samples where the first 
sample is the sample prior to 2003 and the second sample is the post 2003 sample. We can 
examine these 2 samples separately.  
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2.6 Analysis 
Table 23 is the summary statistics of sample firms grouped according to industry. The non-
utilities and non-financial firms comprises of agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, real estate and holding 
companies, services, and public administration. Column 2 is the SIC codes which 
corresponds to the type of industry for each firm in the sample. Column 3 and 4 are the 
number of firms and the percentage of firms for all firms in the sample. Column 5 and 6 are 
the number of dividend paying firms and the percentage of dividend paying firms.  Column 7 
and 8 correspond to the number of non-dividend paying firms and the percentage of non-
dividend paying firms.  The total number of firms for non-utilities and non-financial firms is 
272,327 firms. 
The summary statistics for utilities and financial companies are also reported and located in 
table 23. However, these firms will be excluded from my sample to avoid any sample bias. 
The utility firms are highly regulated firms while the financial firms are highly leveraged 
firms. These exclusions help to mitigate any sample biasness that can affect our results from 
the analysis. For both dividend and non-dividend paying firms, the highest number of firms 
comes from the manufacturing industry with 40% and 41% respectively and the lowest 
number of firms comes from the agriculture, forestry and fishing with 0.448% and 0.449% 
respectively.   
In table 24, the sample is divided into share repurchases and non-share repurchases samples, 
both dividend and share repurchases sample and both non-dividend and non-share 
repurchases sample. Consistent with previous table, manufacturing firms dominate the 
sample with 39% and 40% in both dividend and share repurchases sample and both non-
dividend and non-share repurchases sample respectively. Meanwhile, agriculture, forestry 
and fishing industry has the lowest number of firms with 11.86% and 11.22% in both 
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dividend and share repurchases sample and both non-dividend and non-share repurchases 
sample respectively. 
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Industry  SIC Codes All firms   
Dividend paying firms 
only   
Non Dividend paying 
firms   
    
No of 
firms 
% of 
firms No of firms % of firms No of firms % of firms 
Non utilities and non-financial 
       Agriculture, forestry and fishing 100-999 1219 0.447624 204 0.44276599 1015 0.4486128 
Mining and construction 1000-1999 30132 11.06464 4056 8.80322959 26076 11.525151 
Manufacturing 2000-3999 113635 41.72741 18726 40.6433129 94909 41.948173 
Transportation 4000-4799 7555 2.774238 1987 4.31262751 5568 2.4609618 
Wholesale and retail trade 5000-5999 28274 10.38237 2890 6.27251812 25384 11.219299 
Real estate and holding cos 6500-6999 38589 14.1701 14854 32.2394409 23735 10.490469 
Services 7000-8999 48475 17.80029 3118 6.76737422 45357 20.047027 
Public Administration 9000-9999 4448 1.633331 239 0.51873074 4209 1.8603068 
Total for non-utilities and non-financials 272327 
 
46074 
 
226253 
 
        
Utilities 
4800-
4999 24806 37.75417 7649 27.3051797 17157 45.520151 
Financials 
6000-
6499 40898 62.24583 20364 72.6948203 20534 54.479849 
Total for utilities and financial 
 
65704 
 
28013 
 
37691 
 
                
        Table 23: Summary statistics of sample firms by industry.  
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SIC Codes 
Share 
Repurchases 
 
Non Share 
Repurchases 
 
Share repurchases 
and 
 
Non share repurchases and  
 
firms   firms   
dividend paying 
firms   
non dividend paying 
firms   
  No of firms 
% of 
firms No of firms 
% of 
firms No of firms 
% of 
firms No of firms 
% of 
firms 
         100-999 275 0.1071 944 0.4444 53 0.3389 1166 0.4542 
1000-1999 4938 1.9237 25194 11.8614 1318 8.4271 28814 11.2253 
2000-3999 28892 11.2557 84743 39.8971 8738 55.8696 104897 40.8657 
4000-4799 1793 0.6985 5762 2.7128 689 4.4054 6866 2.6749 
5000-5999 8162 3.1797 20112 9.4687 1326 8.4783 26948 10.4984 
6500-6999 3858 1.5030 34731 16.3514 1888 12.0716 36701 14.2980 
7000-8999 11518 4.4872 36957 17.3994 1534 9.8082 46941 18.2873 
9000-9999 487 0.1897 3961 1.8648 94 0.6010 4354 1.6962 
 
59923 
 
212404 
 
15640 
 
256687 
 
         4800-4999 7471 13.3047 17335 35.8509 3722 38.9697 21084 37.5474 
6000-6499 9880 17.5948 31018 64.1491 5829 61.0303 35069 62.4526 
 
17351 
 
48353 
 
9551 
 
56153 
 
                  
         Table 24: Summary statistics of sample firms by industry and according to the distribution of share repurchases, non-share repurchases, both share repurchases and dividend 
paying and both non-share repurchases and non-dividend paying firms. 
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Figure 1: Sample firms by industry 
 
This figure illustrates the distribution of dividend and non-dividend paying, share 
repurchases, non-share repurchases, both share repurchases and dividend paying and both 
non-share repurchases and non-dividend paying firms based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. The sample period spans from 1981 until 2011. This figure draws 
the same conclusion from the previous table where I find that manufacturing firms dominate 
the sample.  
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Variable Mean 
Stud 
Dev Minimum Maximum 
          
Pb DED 0.02592 0.1589 0 1 
Pb TRA 0.10283 0.30374 0 1 
Pb QIX 0.23516 0.4241 0 1 
SIZE 47.6743 530.441 0 37712 
LEV 0.2831 7.38291 0 2176 
NOI -0.0825 48.5865 -258.75 12.99 
CE 0.0725 0.82234 -2.7717 341 
MB 18.0948 338.96 -35.807 70176.57 
          
     Table 25: Summary statistics of institutional investors by types and corresponding control variables. 
Table 25 presents the summary statistics of the types of institutional investors and its control 
variables. The type of institutional investors consists of the dedicated (DED), quasi indexer 
(QIX) and transient (TRA) institutional investors where dedicated institutional investors are 
considered as long term institutional investors, quasi indexer as both long and short term 
institutional investors and transient as short term institutional investors. Using Bushee’s 
institutional investors’ classification and data, dedicated, quasi indexer and transient are 
measured in terms of probability where 1 is the probability of being either a dedicated, a 
quasi-indexer or a transient institutional investor and 0 is the probability of being neither a 
dedicated, a quasi-indexer nor a transient institutional investor. However, in our data set, 
since we are not interested in a quasi-indexer institutional investor, I am omitting the variable 
in our analysis. The purpose of including quasi-indexer institutional investor in this summary 
statistics is just to show that institutional investors can be heterogeneous in terms of type. 
Since institutional investors are known as sophisticated investor, this heterogeneous 
classification demonstrates how sophisticated they can be. The ability to act as both short and 
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long term institutional investors requires great knowledge, skills, ability and resources. The 
control variables are size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), non-operating income (NOI), capital 
expenditure (CE) and market to book ratio (MB). In table 25, quasi indexer institutional 
investors on average are higher compared to dedicated and transient institutional investors 
with the average of 0.23 or 23%. Dedicated institutional investors have the lowest average 
with 0.02 or 2%. The result is also consistent for the standard deviation with quasi indexer 
institutional investors demonstrate the highest standard deviation with 0.42 or 42%. 
Meanwhile, dedicated institutional investors have the lowest standard deviation with 0.16 or 
16%.  The mean and standard deviation for firm size measured as the log of total asset are 
4767.43 (in ‘00) and 53044.1 (in ’00) respectively. The minimum value is 0 and the 
maximum value is 37,712 (in ’00). The mean and standard deviation for leverage measured 
as total debt are 0.28 and 0.42 respectively. The minimum value is 0 and the maximum value 
is 2176. The mean and standard deviation for non-operating income are -0.0.08 and 48.59 
respectively. The minimum value is -258.75(in ‘00) and the maximum value is 12.99 (in ’00). 
The mean and standard deviation for capital expenditure are 0.07 and 0.82 respectively. The 
minimum value is -2.77 and the maximum value is 341. The mean and standard deviation for 
market to book ratio are 18.09(‘00) and 338.96(‘00) respectively. The minimum value is -
35.80(in `00) and the maximum value is 70176.57 (in `00).  
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Table 26: Correlation matrix between the important variables in the dividend and non-dividend sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27:  Correlation matrix between the important variables in the share repurchases and non-share 
repurchases sample 
Table 26 and 27 are the correlation matrix for dividend and non-dividend paying firms and 
share repurchases and non-share repurchases firms. Table 28 below is the correlation matrix 
for both share repurchases and dividend paying firms and both non-share repurchases and 
non-dividend paying firms. 
 
 
              
       
 
PB DIV LEV SIZE NOI  CE MB 
              
       PB DIV 1.0000 
     PB DED  0.5400      
LEV -0.0068 1.0000 
    SIZE 0.0873 -0.0013 1.0000 
   NOI 0.0012 0.0005 0.0002 1.0000 
  CE -0.0113 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0012 1.0000 
 MB 0.0114 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0017 0.0025 1.0000 
                     
                
        
 
PB_SP LEV SIZE OI NOI  CE MB 
                
        PB_SP 1.0000 
      LEV -0.0076 1.0000 
     SIZE 0.0469 -0.0013 1.0000 
    NOI 0.0013 0.0005 0.0002 
 
1.0000 
  CE -0.0069 -0.0112 -0.0045 
 
-0.0012 1.0000 
 MB 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0046 
 
-0.0017 0.0025 1.0000 
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Table 28: Correlation matrix between the important variables in the share repurchases and dividend paying firms 
and non-share repurchases and non-dividend paying sample 
 
In my first hypotheses, I argue that the presence of long term institutional investors increases 
the likelihood of dividends and magnitude of dividends. This is followed by the second 
hypotheses; higher ownership by long term institutional investors increases the likelihood and 
magnitude of dividend. Firms with higher ownership of long term institutional investors and 
the likelihood of having long term institutional investors are positively related to the 
likelihood of firm paying dividend and the magnitude of dividend because long term 
institutional investors focus on monitoring and not trading for short term profit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
        
 
PB_SP_DIV LEV SIZE OI NOI  CE MB 
                
        PB_SP_DIV 1.0000 
      LEV -0.0035 1.0000 
     SIZE 0.0765 -0.0013 1.0000 
    NOI 0.0009 0.0005 0.0002 
 
1.0000 
  CE -0.0092 -0.0112 -0.0045 
 
-0.0012 1.0000 
 MB 0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0046 
 
-0.0017 0.0025 1.0000 
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       Intercept [-1.2805]*** [-1.3346]*** [-1.311]*** [-1.3085]*** [-1.305]*** [-1.1607]*** 
 
0.00421 0.00466 0.0053 0.00531 0.00634 0.0128 
Pb DED 0.4406*** 0.4759*** 0.461*** 0.4592*** 0.23098*** 0.3843*** 
 
0.0266 0.0277 0.0278 2.78E-02 0.033 0.0557 
Size 
 
0.000008755*** 0.000008693*** 0.000008656*** 0.000007779*** 0.000198*** 
  
2.37E-07 2.36E-07 2.36E-07 2.48E-07 3.35E-06 
Lev 
  
[-0.1124]*** [-0.111]*** -0.0189 0.0551** 
   
0.013 0.0131 0.00571 0.0221 
NOI 
   
0.000688 0.000782 -0.00136 
    
0.000775 0.000836 0.0073 
CE 
   
` [-2.2463]*** -0.4888 
     
0.0653 0.0957 
MB 
     
4.23E-07 
      
3.69E-07 
       AIC 355259.97 302400.52 300367.26 298856.85 264806.36 71972.394 
SIC 355281.43 302432.27 300409.58 298909.71 264869.43 72036.014 
              
       Table 29: Probit Regression for dividend and non-dividend sample (Model 1) 
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In table 29 is the results for probit regression analysis which corresponds to model 1. The 
dependent variable is the probability of firm issuing dividend where the probability is equal 
to 1 if the firm in our sample issues dividend to their shareholders and it is equal to 0 if the 
firm in our sample does not issue dividend to their shareholders. The probability of firm 
issuing dividend is regressed against the indicator variable for presence of dedicated 
institutional investors, (Pb DED) and the control variables. The probability of firm with 
dedicated institutional investor is equal to 1 if the firm has dedicated institutional investor and 
equal to 0 if the firm has no dedicated institutional investor. The control variables are firm 
size, leverage, non-operating income, capital expenditure and market to book ratio. For all 
tables in this chapter, * corresponds to a coefficient estimate which is statistically significant 
at 10% significance level, ** corresponds to a coefficient estimate which is significant at 5% 
significance level and *** corresponds to a coefficient estimate which is significant at 1% 
significance level. This is consistent for all tables in this essay. In table 29, the coefficient for 
the indicator variable for presence of dedicated institutional investors is positive and highly 
significant. In the first column, even when we omit the control variables, the probability of a 
firm having a dedicated institutional investor is positive and highly statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  In column 3 until column 7, after adding some control 
variable, the coefficient for probability of a firm having a dedicated institutional investor is 
still positive and statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. So, when the 
dependent variable is the likelihood of firm issuing dividend, the presence of dedicated 
institutional investors (Pb Ded) positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of 
firm issuing dividend. This result supports our first hypotheses which posit that the presence 
of dedicated institutional investors increases the likelihood of dividends.  
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Since there are possibilities that the firm’s decision to issue dividend affect the type of 
institutional investors, we need to control for the endogeniety.  In table 30, I present the 
endogeneity test results for the probit regression analysis using Heckman’s (1979) 2 stage 
model. At the first stage, the indicator variable for presence of dedicated institutional 
investors in the prior year is regressed against the probability of a firm issuing dividend 
together with the control variables controlling for institutional presence in the prior year (t-1). 
At this stage, I obtain the inverse Miller ratio (IMR) and I am going to use this IMR in our 
second stage regression. In the second stage, the probability of a firm issuing dividend is 
regressed against the indicator variable for presence of dedicated institutional investors and 
the control variables.  I find that even after controlling for endogeneity, the coefficient for the 
indicator variable for presence of dedicated institutional investors is still positive and highly 
significant. So, the presence of dedicated institutional investors (Pb Ded) positively and 
highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing dividend. 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** 
 
0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 
lag  Pb div 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
lag size 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Second Stage 
      Intercept 39.5802*** 39.5099*** 39.9636*** 40.0314*** 36.0583*** 26.188*** 
 
1.1982 1.2169 1.22E+00 1.2213 1.3133 2.4673 
Pb Ded 0.4418*** 0.4288*** 0.4236*** 0.4222*** 0.1911*** 0.3511*** 
 
0.0281 0.0282 0.0283 0.0283 0.0335 0.0557 
Size 
 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
  
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0 
Lev 
  
[-0.0922]*** [-0.0909]*** [-0.0162]*** 0.0777*** 
   
0.0124 0.0125 0.0053 0.0235 
NOI 
   
6.00E-04 7.00E-04 -0.0018 
    
8.00E-04 9.00E-04 0.0072 
CE 
    
[-2.1855]*** [-0.4127]*** 
     
0.0673 0.0951 
MB 
     
0.0000 
      
0.0000 
IMR [-52.085]*** [-52.0138]*** [-52.5649]*** [-52.6487]*** [-47.576]*** [-34.7722]*** 
 
1.5274 1.5513 1.5537 1.5569 1.6741 3.1443 
 
            
AIC 296321.3002 287579.4591 287042.2728 285804.5772 254755.3304 70707.5426 
BIC 296352.965 287621.5574 287094.8836 285867.6784 254828.5289 70780.079 
              
       Table 30: Endogeneity test results for model 1 
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       Intercept [-0.8173]*** [-0.8406]*** [-0.827]*** [-0.8255]*** [-0.822]*** [-0.6642]*** 
 
0.00256 0.0028 0.00314 0.00315 0.00368 0.00759 
Pb DED 0.2971*** 0.3175*** 0.3083*** 0.3073*** 0.1688*** 0.2636*** 
 
0.0161 0.0167 0.0168 1.68E-02 0.0192 0.0332 
Pb TRA 0.421*** 0.4163*** 0.4127*** 0.4115*** 0.4098*** 0.404*** 
 
0.00852 0.00901 0.00904 9.04E-03 0.00957 0.0172 
Size  
 
0.000002201*** 0.000002193*** 0.000002188*** 0.000001988*** 0.000052*** 
  
8.42E-08 8.41E-08 8.41E-08 9.09E-08 1.09E-06 
Lev 
  
-0.0641*** -0.0633*** -0.0101*** 0.0524*** 
   
0.00718 0.00719 (0.00292) 0.0143 
NOI  
   
0.000428 0.000485 -0.00184 
    
0.000455 0.000494 0.00428 
CE 
    
-1.3142*** -0.3552*** 
     
0.0352 0.055 
MB 
     
2.52E-07 
      
1.93E-07 
       AIC 352875.92 301200.93 299193.33 297693.03 263582.77 74263.07 
SIC 352908.11 301243.27 299246.22 297756.47 263656.35 74335.779 
              
       Table 31: Probit Regression for dividend and non-dividend sample (Model 1) 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** 
 
0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 
lag Pb div 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
lag size 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Second Stage 
      Intercept 39.9375*** 39.8664*** 40.3152*** 40.3915*** 36.4181*** 26.6771*** 
 
1.2029 1.2214 1.22E+00 1.2257 1.3177 2.4778 
Pb Ded 0.5053*** 0.4903*** 0.485*** 0.4836*** 0.2519*** 0.4202*** 
 
0.0282 0.0283 0.0283 0.0283 0.0335 0.0558 
Pb Tra 0.6784*** 0.6452*** 0.6411*** 0.6395*** 0.644*** 0.6387*** 
 
0.0151 1.52E-02 1.52E-02 1.52E-02 1.62E-02 0.0287 
Size 
 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lev 
  
[-0.0842]*** [-0.0828]*** [-0.0142]*** 0.08*** 
   
0.0122 0.0122 0.005 0.0236 
NOI 
   
6.00E-04 7.00E-04 -0.0018 
    
8.00E-04 9.00E-04 0.0073 
CE 
    
[-2.2759]*** [-0.4498]*** 
     
0.0685 0.0967 
MB 
     
0.0000 
      
0.0000 
IMR [-52.6213]*** [-52.546]*** [-53.0926]*** [-53.1873]*** [-48.1057]*** -35.4811 
 
1.5334 1.5569 1.5594 1.5625 1.6797 3.1577 
       
AIC 294426.5257 285889.452 285374.194 284147.5709 253293.007 70226.8067 
BIC 294468.7454 285942.0749 285437.327 284221.1889 253376.6624 70308.4101 
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       Continuation from previous table…. 
…..Table 32: Endogeneity test results for model 1. 
 
Table 31 and table 32 are the result for probit model using model 1 and the endogeneity test result for the probit model respectively. The 
difference between these tables and the previous tables is that another variable is added as the independent variable which is the indicator 
variable for presence of transient institutional investor (Pb TRA). Even after including this variable, the result remains the same. The coefficient 
estimate for the presence of dedicated institutional investors (Pb DED) is still positive and highly significant across column. However, the 
coefficient estimate for the presence of transient institutional investor (Pb TRA) is also positive and highly significant. The result suggest that the 
presence of dedicated and transient institutional investors positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing dividend. The 
likelihood of firm having transient institutional investors (Pb Tra) is also positively related to the dependent variable could suggest that firms 
may undertake both dividends and share repurchases since in this sample I am not controlling for firms which undertake share repurchases. Even 
after controlling for the endogeniety in table 32, the results persist for both dedicated and transient institutional investors.  
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Table 33: Probit Regression for Model 2 
 
 
 
    
 
          
        Intercept [-0.3819]*** [-0.4006]*** [-0.4158]*** [-0.4178]*** [-0.4178]*** [-0.4311]*** [-0.4234]*** 
 
0.00399 0.0042 0.00547 0.00546 0.00546 0.00692 0.0125 
PIH DED 0.3194*** 0.335*** 0.3304*** 0.3345*** 0.3345*** 0.2434*** 0.7272*** 
 
0.0718 0.0733 0.0733 7.35E-02 0.0735 0.0765 0.1695 
Size  
 
0.000001577*** 0.000001583*** 0.000001583*** 0.000001588*** 0.000001399*** 0.000042*** 
  
9.82E-08 9.84E-08 9.84E-08 9.86E-08 1.01E-07 1.32E-06 
Lev 
  
0.0804*** 0.0804*** 0.0916*** 0.3237*** 0.1817*** 
   
0.0193 0.0193 0.0192 0.0209 0.0357 
NOI  
    
0.0125 0.1179*** -0.1003 
     
0.0117 0.0124 0.1465 
CE 
     
[-1.8144]*** -0.1256 
      
0.0682 0.0999 
MB 
      
3.39E-07 
       
2.86E-07 
        AIC 136118.36 125642 124974.07 124974.07 124775.47 111828.19 35365.509 
SIC 136137.49 125670.47 125012 125012 124822.88 111884.65 35423.23 
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First Stage 
     Intercept [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** 
 
0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 
lag Pb div 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
lag size 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Second Stage 
     Intercept 36.5169*** 38.4844*** 38.4264*** 34.0955*** 26.067*** 
 
1.8085 1.8207 1.82E+00 1.947 3.5286 
PIH Ded 0.5766*** 0.6295*** 0.6346*** 0.48*** 1.772*** 
 
0.1219 0.1236 0.124 0.1289 0.3217 
Size 
 
0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lev 
 
0.2588*** 0.278*** 0.8225*** 0.1407*** 
  
0.0328 0.0328 0.0348 0.0596 
NOI 
  
0.0908*** 0.3006*** -1.92E-01 
   
0.0204 2.02E-02 2.38E-01 
CE 
   
[-3.2627]*** -0.235 
    
0.1213 0.17 
MB 
    
0.0000 
     
0.0000 
IMR [-47.3473]*** [-49.9355]*** [-49.8954]*** [-44.4174]*** [-34.2427]*** 
 
2.3052 2.3232 2.3252 2.4817 4.4968 
            
AIC 123311.327 121841.614 121662.639 109297.0405 33725.8524 
BIC 123339.735 121888.942 121719.424 109362.8056 33791.7225 
            
Table 34: Endogeneity Test for Model 2 
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In table 33 and table 34 I present the results for the probit model using model 2 and the 
endogeneity test result for the probit model. The difference between these tables compared to 
tables 31 and 32 is that the indicator variable for presence of dedicated institutional investor 
(Pb DED) is being replaced with the ownership of dedicated institutional investors (PIH 
Ded). The general magnitude (PIH) is measured as the ratio of total shares held by 
institutional investors and the total shares outstanding. Then I identify the institutional 
ownership according to type (PIH Type) using Bushee’s Institutional Investor Classification. 
After replacing the presence of dedicated institutional investor with the ownership of 
institutional investors (PIH Ded), the result remains the same. The coefficient estimate for the 
ownership of dedicated institutional investors (PIH Ded) is still positive and highly 
significant across column.  The result suggests that the ownership of dedicated institutional 
investors (PIH Ded) positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing 
dividend. Even after controlling for endogeniety in table 34, the results persist where the 
ownership for dedicated institutional investors (PIH Ded) positively and highly significantly 
affects the likelihood of firm issuing dividend. 
Table 35 is the probit regression analysis result for model 2 with the inclusion of the 
institutional ownership of transient institutional investor (PIH TRA). Table 36 is the 
endogeneity test result for this probit regression model. I find that the results are consistent 
with the previous results using both presence of dedicated institutional investor (Pb DED) 
and presence of transient institutional investor (Pb TRA), where both coefficient estimates 
are positive and highly significant. Even after controlling for the endogeneity in table 36, the 
results remain the same. The results suggest that the ownership of dedicated and transient 
institutional investors positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing 
dividend. I find that using both measures; the ownership of certain type of institutional 
investors and the presence of certain type of institutional investors gives us the same result.  
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Intercept [-0.3942]*** [-0.4148]*** [-0.43]*** [-0.432]*** [-0.4449]*** [-0.4566]*** 
 
0.00414 0.00437 0.0056 0.00559 0.00701 0.0127 
PIH DED 0.34*** 0.3589*** 0.3543*** 0.3584*** 0.2698*** 0.8006*** 
 
0.0721 0.0736 0.0736 7.38E-02 0.0767 0.1731 
PIH TRA 0.5488*** 0.5946*** 0.5963*** 0.5965*** 0.6897*** 1.7464*** 
 
0.0491 0.0499 0.0502 5.02E-02 0.0531 0.1095 
Size  
 
0.000001587*** 0.00000159*** 0.000001596*** 0.000001407*** 0.000043*** 
  
9.84E-08 9.85E-08 9.87E-08 1.01E-07 1.32E-06 
Lev 
  
0.0803*** 0.0914*** 0.3241*** 0.1772*** 
   
0.0193 0.0192 0.0209 0.0359 
NOI  
   
0.0122 0.1178*** -0.1426 
    
0.0115 0.0124 0.1481 
CE 
    
[-1.8632]*** [-0.2274]** 
     
0.0686 0.1009 
MB 
     
4.33E-07 
      
3.50E-07 
       AIC 135993.13 125498.35 124830.72 124631.99 111654.92 35067.122 
SIC 136021.81 125536.3 124878.14 124688.88 111720.79 35133.09 
              
       Table 35: Probit Regression for Model 2 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** 
 
0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 
lag Pb Div 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
lag size 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Second Stage 
      Intercept 36.7179*** 38.7029*** 38.6826*** 38.6466*** 34.3246*** 26.9885*** 
 
1.8098 1.8221 1.82E+00 1.8257 1.9489 3.547 
PIH Ded 0.6139*** 0.6701*** 0.6674*** 0.6752*** 0.5238*** 1.9789*** 
 
0.1225 0.1243 0.1243 0.1247 0.1296 0.3301 
PIH Tra 0.8988*** 0.9532*** 0.9489*** 0.9492*** 1.1142*** 3.1067*** 
 
0.0822 8.29E-02 8.28E-02 8.29E-02 8.83E-02 0.1868 
Size 
 
0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0000**** 0.0001*** 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lev 
  
0.2575**** 0.2763*** 0.8232*** 0.1366** 
   
0.0329 0.0329 0.0348 0.06 
NOI 
   
0.0897*** 0.3004*** -0.259 
    
2.05E-02 2.02E-02 0.2428 
CE 
    
[-3.3473]*** [-0.4152]** 
     
0.1222 0.173 
MB 
     
0.0000 
      
0.0000 
IMR [-47.6302]*** [-50.213]*** 
[-
50.2451]*** [-50.2045]*** [-44.7375]*** [-35.4906]*** 
 
2.3069 2.3226 2.325 2.3271 2.4841 4.5204 
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AIC 123191.523 121904.4855 121602.7835 121530.5226 109135.654 33418.6377 
BIC 123229.401 121951.8204 121651.3461 121596.7722 109210.814 33492.7416 
              
       Table 36: Endogeneity test results for model 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation from previous table…… 
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       Intercept 2.40423*** 2.21997*** 2.0287*** 1.91528*** 1.88371*** 1.07855*** 
 
0.05977 0.06165 0.07101 0.05049 0.06711 0.09124 
PIH DED 2.28566** 2.64063*** 2.64423*** 2.73211*** 2.67614*** 4.63812*** 
 
0.98261 1.00045 1.00241 7.12E-01 0.76145 1.09785 
Size 
 
0.00000203*** 0.00000207*** 0.0000022*** 0.00000195*** 0.00001923*** 
  
7.61E-07 7.62E-07 5.41E-07 5.85E-07 3.29E-06 
Lev 
  
0.9995*** 1.13262*** 2.33895*** 1.96842*** 
   
0.18266 0.13007 0.17247 0.26662 
NOI 
   
0.00922 0.87029*** 2.09182* 
    
0.01145 0.10799 1.1073 
CE 
    
[-5.48]*** -0.55033 
     
0.6112 0.7401 
MB 
     
-2.27E-07 
      
1.24E-06 
       R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0016 0.0045 0.004 
Adj R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 0.0044 0.0038 
              
       Table 37: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression for Model 3 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-1.9469]*** [-1.9469]*** [-1.9469]*** [-1.9469]*** [-1.9469]*** [-1.9469]*** 
 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
lag DY -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
lag size 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
  0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Second Stage 
      Intercept [-248.64273]*** [-373.04794]* [-403.40738]** [-427.20284]** [-356.34697]* -899.5857 
 
70.81312 195.47371 1.95E+02 188.75787 202.98736 637.53601 
PIH Ded 3.66876*** 3.66905*** 3.672*** 3.61846*** 3.74857** 1.53299 
 
1.40419 1.40588 1.40551 1.35707 1.46425 1.79958 
Size 
 
-1.5800E-06 -1.8900E-06 -2.0700E-06 -1.5200E-06 0.00000179 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00001215 
Lev 
  
1.59956*** 1.70511*** 2.32569*** 2.75434*** 
   
0.20938 0.20745 0.22687 0.28522 
NOI 
   
1.92E+00 4.05E-01 0.47078 
    
1.21E+00 1.47E+00 1.09338 
CE 
    
[-5.6719]*** -0.26835 
     
0.92211 0.80419 
MB 
     
-4.95E-08 
      
0.0000 
IMR 320.94385*** 480.11468* 518.56441** 548.91559** 458.38818* 1152.11598 
 
90.58946 250.09525 250.08992 241.50134 259.70538 815.72199 
              
R2 0.0005 0.0005 0.0021 0.0025 0.0046 0.0084 
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Adj R2 0.0005 0.0005 0.002 0.0023 0.0044 0.008 
              
       Table 38: Endogeneity test results for model 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation from previous table……. 
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Next, I replace the dependent with dividend yield instead of the probability of firm issuing 
dividend. Dividend yield is measured as the ratio of gross annual cash dividends per share in 
$ during the year (Compustat Data Item 26). Table 37 is the result for the ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression with ownership of dedicated institutional investors (PIH DED) as 
the independent variable. Consistent with our previous results, the coefficient estimate for 
ownership of dedicated institutional investors (PIH DED) is positive and highly significant 
for column 3,4,5,6 and 7. The coefficient estimate for ownership of dedicated institutional 
investors (PIH DED) in column 2 is positive and significant at 5% and 10% level of 
significance. Table 38 is the endogeneity test for this OLS regression. After controlling for 
endogeneity, the results remain the same across column. The coefficient for PIH DED is 
positive and highly significant (at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance).  
In the following table (table 39), a variable representing the ownership for transient 
institutional investors (PIH TRA) is added in the regression model. We find that the 
ownership of dedicated institutional investors (PIH DED) remains positive and highly 
significant across column. But the most notable result that I obtain from this analysis comes 
from the coefficient estimate for ownership of transient institutional investor (PIH TRA). The 
coefficient estimate for ownership of transient institutional investor (PIH TRA) is no longer 
significant. I find that the ownership of dedicated institutional investors positively and highly 
significantly affects dividend yield while the ownership of transient institutional investors is 
insignificant.  This result remains the same even after controlling for endogeneity in table 40. 
Using dividend yield as the dependent variable, I find stronger support for my hypotheses. As 
the ownership of dedicated institutional investors increases, the dividend yield increases after 
controlling for transient investors. 
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       Intercept 2.41214*** 2.21676*** 2.02587*** 1.90671*** 1.88191*** 1.06761*** 
 
0.06168 0.06369 0.07277 0.05174 0.06792 0.09223 
PIH 
DED 2.27383** 2.64543*** 2.6485*** 2.745*** 2.67911*** 4.66318*** 
 
0.98288 1.00075 1.00271 7.12E-01 0.76165 1.09829 
PIH 
TRA -0.37676 0.1467 0.13101 3.96E-01 0.09666 0.61754 
 
0.72439 0.73132 0.73669 5.23E-01 0.56105 0.75831 
Size 
 
0.00000203*** 0.00000207*** 0.00000221*** 0.00000195*** 0.00001933*** 
  
7.61E-07 7.63E-07 5.41E-07 5.85E-07 3.29E-06 
Lev 
  
0.99937*** 1.13224*** 2.3388*** 1.96703*** 
   
0.18266 0.13007 0.17248 0.26663 
NOI  
   
0.0092 0.8702*** 2.07663* 
    
0.01145 0.108 1.10747 
CE 
    
[-5.48424]*** [-0.58317] 
     
0.6117 0.7412 
MB 
     
[-2.17E-07] 
      
1.24E-06 
       R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0016 0.0045 0.004 
Adj R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 0.0044 0.0038 
              
       Table 39: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression for Model 3 
104 
 
 
              
First Stage 
      Intercept [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** [-2.0863]*** 
 
0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 
lag div 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
lag size 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
 
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
lag lev 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Second Stage 
      Intercept [-248.77665]*** [-373.13489]** [-403.47815]*** [-427.32514]*** [-355.98354]** -892.42486 
 
70.81946 195.47722 1.95E+02 188.76103 202.99317 638.08929 
Pb Ded 3.67323*** 3.67339*** 3.6756*** 3.62518*** 3.73933** 1.54631 
 
1.40451 1.4062 1.40583 1.35739 1.46455 1.80029 
Pb Tra 0.13789 1.3377E-01 1.1086E-01 2.0676E-01 -3.0356E-01 0.24763 
 
0.89973 9.03E-01 9.03E-01 8.72E-01 9.33E-01 0.90286 
Size 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000195 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00001216 
Lev 
  
1.59948*** 1.70482*** 2.32583*** 2.75442*** 
   
0.20938 0.20745 0.22687 0.28522 
NOI 
   
1.92E+00 0.41194*** 0.46705 
    
1.21E+00 1.47E+00 1.0935 
CE 
    
[-5.65828]*** -0.28078 
     
0.92307 0.80549 
MB 
     
0.0000 
      
0.0000 
IMR 321.11206*** 480.22289** 518.65246** 549.06747** 457.92886* 1142.94911 
 
90.59732 250.09968 250.09434 241.50533 259.71272 816.43059 
              
R2 0.0005 0.0005 0.0021 0.0025 0.0046 0.0084 
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Adj R2 0.0004 0.0004 0.002 0.0023 0.0044 0.0079 
              
       
Continuation from previous table…. 
…..Table 40: Endogeneity test results for model 3. 
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In third hypotheses, I argue that the presence of short term institutional investors increases 
the likelihood and the magnitude of share repurchases. This is followed by the fourth 
hypotheses where higher institutional ownership by short term institutional investors increase 
the likelihood and magnitude of share repurchases. I argue that firms with higher ownership 
of short term institutional investors and the likelihood of having short term institutional 
investors are positively related to the likelihood of firms undertaking share repurchases and 
the magnitude of share repurchases because short term institutional investors focus on trading 
and not monitoring. For the analysis, the dependent variable will be share repurchases and the 
independent variables will be the types of institutional investors and control variables. I am 
adopting 3 types of measurements for share repurchases. The first measure is using 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) measurement for share repurchases which is the 
purchases of common and preferred stock (Compustat Item #115). Second measurement for 
share repurchases is a measurement for tender offer events obtained from CRSP with 
distribution codes 6261 and 6561. According to CRSP manual, share repurchases with code 
6261 are common shares decreased through companies own tender offer with tax-status 
unknown. Share repurchases with code 6561 is defined as common shares reduced through 
company’s own exchange offer with tax status unspecified and not applicable. The third 
measurement is using Stephens and Weisbach (1998) measurement for open share 
repurchases. From the sample, I identify distribution events such as stock splits, dividend and 
tender offers. These events will then be omitted from the sample. Next, I identify firms that 
experience a decrease in number of shares outstanding. We are assuming that the decrease in 
number of shares outstanding is due to open share repurchases events. 
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       Intercept 31.35594*** 17.15167*** 17.12375*** 17.12872*** 17.33831*** 6.05132*** 
 
0.92334 0.85833 0.86154 0.8618 0.87234 2.01936 
Pb Tra 22.24568*** 16.90065*** 16.94984*** 16.94142*** 17.15619*** 13.43775** 
 
3.32135 3.07748 3.08226 3.08E+00 3.11666 5.90611 
Size  
 
0.00338*** 0.00338*** 0.00338*** 0.0034*** 0.01404*** 
  
1.63E-05 1.63E-05 1.63E-05 1.67E-05 1.18E-04 
Lev 
  
-0.03528 -0.03529 -0.04052 [-8.04883]* 
   
0.10754 0.10756 0.11935 3.63065 
NOI  
   
0.0011 0.0011 0.21021 
    
0.01608 0.01612 1.38044 
CE 
    
-0.47099 -2.82125 
     
0.98206 4.63711 
MB 
     
1.16E-05 
      
5.48E-05 
       R2 0.0002 0.1418 0.1422 0.1422 0.1396 0.1885 
Adj R2 0.0002 0.1418 0.1421 0.1421 0.1395 0.1884 
              
       Table 41: Regression for Model 6 Jaganathan et al (2000) Purchases of common and preferred stock (Dep prstkc)  
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** 
 
0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 
lag prstkc 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
Second Stage 
      Intercept [-18262]*** [-1133.12498]*** [-1138.8154]*** [-1138.85248]*** [-946.15443]*** -1078.49595 
 
319.16518 311.57637 3.12E+02 312.34674 314.63195 722.5736 
Pb Tra 19.9586*** 16.74603*** 16.7634*** 16.75855*** 17.10277*** 17.29149*** 
 
4.03484 3.74839 3.75114 3.75164 3.79155 6.79009 
Size 
 
0.00355*** 0.00355*** 0.00355*** 0.00358*** 0.01524*** 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00013486 
Lev 
  
-0.06369 -0.0637 -0.07123 [-8.2964]** 
   
0.12334 0.12335 0.13881 3.87777 
NOI 
   
1.13E-03 1.13E-03 0.57244 
    
1.74E-02 1.74E-02 2.36658 
CE 
    
-0.39559 -2.32516 
     
1.08268 4.83197 
MB 
     
1.15E-05 
      
0.0001 
IMR 24391*** 1535.77559*** 1543.38557*** 1543.44151*** 1286.8128*** 1443.07884 
 
425.4709 415.39214 416.36848 416.42236 419.46992 963.36026 
              
R2 0.0162 0.1511 0.1512 0.1512 0.1481 0.2103 
Adj R2 0.0162 0.1511 0.1512 0.1512 0.1481 0.2102 
              
  
     Table 42: Endogeneity Test for Model 6 
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In table 41, I present the results for the regression analysis to test for third and fourth 
hypotheses using the first measurement for share repurchases. The dependent variable is the 
purchases of common and preferred stock (prstkc). This variable is regressed against the 
indicator variable for presence of transient institutional investors (Pb TRA), size, leverage, 
non-operating income, capital expenditure and market to book ratio. I find that the coefficient 
estimate for the indicator variable for presence of transient institutional investors (Pb TRA) is 
positive and highly significant. This result supports our hypotheses, where the magnitude of 
share repurchases is positively related to the likelihood of firm with short term institutional 
investors. Next, I control for endogeneity problem for this problem and the result is presented 
in table 42. After controlling for endogeneity, I find that the presence of transient institutional 
investors remain positive and highly significant.  
Next, using the same model, I add another variable for institutional investor measuring the 
likelihood of long term institutional investors (Pb DED). I find that the presence of transient 
institutional investors remain positive and highly significant while the presence of dedicated 
institutional investors is insignificant in table 43. In table 44, I present the result after 
controlling for endogeneity using the same model. Even after controlling for endogeneity, the 
presence of transient institutional investors remains positive and highly significant. The 
results suggest that the presence of transient institutional investors positively and highly 
significantly affects share repurchases and the presence of dedicated institutional investors is 
insignificant.  
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Table 43: Regression for Model 6 Jaganathan et al (2000) Purchases of common and preferred stock (Dep prstkc)  
 
 
              
       Intercept 31.68474*** 17.35384*** 17.32585*** 17.33091*** 17.53979*** 6.19166*** 
 
0.93305 0.86735 0.87063 0.8709 0.88146 2.04221 
Pb TRA 21.91688*** 16.69922*** 16.74856*** 16.74006*** 16.9557*** 13.2997*** 
 
3.32403 3.07998 3.08478 3.09E+00 3.11919 5.91374 
Pb DED [-15.86641]*** -9.72766 -9.68181 -9.69E+00 -9.68342 -5.29812 
 
6.48152 6.00547 6.0125 6.01E+00 6.07913 11.4952 
Size  
 
0.00338*** 0.00338*** 0.00338*** 0.0034*** 0.01404*** 
  
1.63E-05 1.63E-05 1.63E-05 1.67E-05 1.18E-04 
Lev 
  
-0.03564 -0.03566 -0.04094 [-8.04677]** 
   
0.10754 0.10756 0.11935 3.63068 
NOI  
   
0.00111 0.00111 0.21005 
    
0.01608 0.01612 1.38045 
CE 
    
-0.4736 -2.82651 
     
0.98205 4.63715 
MB 
     
1.14E-05 
      
5.48E-05 
       R2 0.0002 0.1419 0.1422 0.1422 0.1396 0.1885 
Adj R2 0.0002 0.1418 0.1422 0.1421 0.1395 0.1884 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** 
 
0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 
lag prstkc 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
Second Stage 
      Intercept [-18262]*** [-1134.24713]*** [-1140.01818]*** [-1140.05538]*** [-947.33876]*** -1078.37805 
 
319.16021 311.57526 3.12E+02 312.34571 314.63092 722.5791 
Pb Tra 19.5092*** 16.46718*** 16.48408*** 16.47917*** 16.82434*** [17.11666]** 
 
4.03822 3.75156 3.75432 3.75483 3.79474 6.79881 
Pb Ded [-21.26929]*** [-13.20496]* [-13.20395]* [-13.20705]* [-13.23045]* -6.74986 
 
7.88663 7.33E+00 7.33E+00 7.33E+00 7.42E+00 13.24383 
Size 
 
0.00355*** 0.00355*** 0.00355*** 0.00357*** 0.01524*** 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00013487 
Lev 
  
-0.06417 -0.06418 -0.07178 [-8.29206]** 
   
0.12334 0.12335 0.13881 3.87781 
NOI 
   
1.14E-03 1.14E-03 0.57082 
    
1.74E-02 1.74E-02 2.3666 
CE 
    
-0.39847 -2.33045 
     
1.08268 4.83202 
MB 
     
0.0000 
      
0.0001 
IMR 24392*** 1537.64482*** 1545.36302*** 1545.41921*** 1288.76469*** 1443.15769 
 
425.46437 415.39112 416.3676 416.42148 419.46904 963.36756 
              
R2 0.0162 0.1511 0.1512 0.1512 0.1481 0.2103 
Adj R2 0.0162 0.1511 0.1512 0.1512 0.1481 0.2101 
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Continuation from previous table…. 
….Table 44: Endogeneity Test for Model 6 
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Next, I am using the second measurement of share repurchases which is the tender offer. 
Tender offer is measured as events with distribution codes 6261 and 6561 from CRSP 
database. The dependent variable is the probability of a tender offer event, where the 
likelihood of firm issuing share repurchases via tender offer (Pb SP) is equal to 1 if there is 
any tender offer event and 0 if there is no tender offer event. In table 45, the independent 
variables are the indicator variable for presence of transient institutional investors (Pb TRA), 
size, leverage, non-operating income, capital expenditure and market to book ratio. I find that 
using tender offer as a measure of share repurchases, the coefficient estimate for the presence 
of transient institutional investors is not significant and in some cases, it is positive but 
significantly weak. The results could be driven by the fact that tender offers are less 
frequently traded compared to open market share repurchases. So, transient institutional 
investors might be involved in less tender offer activities compared to open share repurchases 
activities. There are also possibilities that the cost to purchases tender offer tend to be slightly 
higher compared to open market share repurchases since it is a closed bid-ask transaction. 
Short term institutional investors known for profiteering might not be in favour for tender 
offer share repurchases activities. After controlling for endogeneity for this probit model in 
table 46, I find that presence of transient institutional investors is insignificant. The results are 
consistent across column.  
Next, I add another independent variable which measure the likelihood of long term 
institutional investors (Pb DED). The results are consistent with our previous results. In table 
47, I find that the coefficient estimate for the presence of transient institutional investors is 
not significant and in some cases, it is positive and significantly weak. I also find that the 
coefficient estimate for the presence of dedicated institutional investors is not significant. 
After controlling for endogeneity (table 48), I find that both coefficient estimates for the 
presence of transient and dedicated institutional investors are insignificant.
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       Intercept [-3.5338]*** [-3.5293]*** [-3.5343]*** [-3.5348]*** [-3.5113]*** [-3.5686]*** 
 
0.0434 0.0468 0.0473 0.0474 0.0571 0.1373 
Pb Tra 0.187* 0.2129** 0.212** 0.2122** 0.163 -2.8375 
 
0.0978 0.0996 0.0997 9.97E-02 0.1087 232.7 
Size  
 
-1.91E-06 -1.90E-06 -1.91E-06 -1.37E-06 8.88E-07 
  
3.96E-06 3.95E-06 3.96E-06 3.62E-06 5.65E-06 
Lev 
  
0.0336 0.0397 0.0434 0.0526 
   
0.0311 0.0331 0.0339 0.2807 
NOI  
   
0.00832 0.0311 0.0538 
    
0.0224 0.0789 0.1888 
CE 
    
-0.2385 0.418 
     
0.5334 0.2833 
MB 
     
-2.00E-04 
      
2.47E-04 
       AIC 882.546 806.627 807.687 809.334 756.779 147.847 
SIC 903.008 836.996 848.16 859.911 817.009 209.601 
              
       Table 45: Probit Regression for tender offer share repurchases (6261, 6561) 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-1.1668]*** [-1.1668]*** [-1.1668]*** [-1.1668]*** [-1.1668]*** [-1.1668]*** 
 
0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 
lag PbSP 0.4349** 0.4349** 0.4349** 0.4349** 0.4349** 0.4349** 
 
0.2109 0.2109 0.2109 0.2109 0.2109 0.2109 
lag size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 
  0.0113 0.0113 0.0113 0.0113 0.0113 0.0113 
Second Stage 
      Intercept -108.29 -116.812 -1.20E+02 -120.466 -299.445 -524.485 
 
393.7477 458.8098 4.67E+02 466.9031 798.421 2188.018 
Pb Tra 0.4282 0.525 0.5277 0.5261 -0.1045 -23.6512 
 
0.5503 0.556 0.5561 0.5564 0.7504 178596 
Size 
 
0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lev 
  
0.1421 0.1482 0.183 0.2763 
   
0.1404 0.1443 0.1536 0.6321 
NOI 
   
2.19E-02 1.20E-01 0.2649 
    
1.09E-01 2.10E-01 0.7635 
CE 
    
0.3909 0.9576 
     
1.6523 0.8494 
MB 
     
-2.00E-03 
      
0.0021 
IMR 138.3041 150.0305 154.7837 155.0632 402.9345 715.0213 
 
545.3979 635.5127 646.221 646.7215 1105.89 3030.559 
              
AIC 436.8935 402.9779 404.4037 406.2625 355.043 90.6988 
BIC 465.4476 440.8707 451.7442 463.0538 420.7604 156.1368 
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Continuation from previous table…. 
…..Table 46: Endogeneity Test for tender offer share repurchases (6261, 6561). 
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       Intercept [-3.5238]*** [-3.5187]*** [-3.5237]*** [-3.5243]*** [-3.5019]*** [-3.5572]*** 
 
0.0436 0.0469 0.0474 0.0476 0.0572 0.1374 
Pb TRA 0.1769* 0.2024** 0.2016** 0.2018** 0.1535 -2.847 
 
0.0979 0.0996 0.0998 9.98E-02 0.1087 232.2 
Pb DED -2.6221 -2.6202 -2.6805 -2.68E+00 -2.689 -2.8584 
 
97.1242 99.6916 118.5 1.19E+02 129.7 470.5 
Size  
 
-1.94E-06 -1.94E-06 -1.95E-06 -1.41E-06 8.37E-07 
  
3.99E-06 3.99E-06 4.00E-06 3.66E-06 5.66E-06 
Lev 
  
0.0337 0.0399 0.0431 0.0529 
   
0.0311 0.0332 0.0339 0.2781 
NOI  
   
0.0083 0.0308 0.053 
    
0.0224 0.0789 0.1895 
CE 
    
-0.2361 0.4158 
     
0.5317 0.2832 
MB 
     
-2.10E-04 
      
2.48E-04 
       AIC 881.742 806.009 807.071 808.715 756.502 149.314 
SIC 912.436 846.502 857.663 869.408 826.769 219.89 
              
       Table 47: Probit Regression for tender offer share repurchases (6261, 6561) 
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First Stage 
      Intercept [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** 
 
0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 
lag Pb Sp 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 00.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
Second Stage 
      Intercept -109.224 -117.594 -1.22E+02 -121.851 -301.587 -520.742 
 
393.9057 458.6158 4.68E+02 468.0432 800.1987 2193.722 
Pb Tra 0.3891 0.4854 0.488 0.4864 -0.14 -23.6913 
 
0.5503 0.556 0.5561 0.5564 0.7504 178544.2 
Pb Ded -21.9614 -2.1900E+01 -2.1910E+01 -2.1913E+01 -2.1914E+01 -23.8107 
 
67612.15 6.86E+04 6.88E+04 6.89E+04 7.56E+04 365153.8 
Size 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Lev 
  
0.1447 0.1511 0.1817 0.2737 
   
0.1387 0.1428 0.1535 0.6296 
NOI 
   
2.20E-02 1.19E-01 0.2617 
    
1.08E-01 2.10E-01 0.7637 
CE 
    
0.3859 0.9498 
     
1.6451 0.8483 
MB 
     
-0.0020 
      
0.0021 
IMR 139.6515 151.1687 156.7033 157.0355 405.9516 709.899 
 
545.6167 635.2441 647.6843 648.3006 1108.353 3038.46 
              
AIC 437.4114 403.6288 405.0462 406.9035 355.9121 92.3768 
BIC 475.4834 450.9948 461.8549 473.1601 431.0176 165.9946 
              
       Table 48: Endogeneity Test for tender offer share repurchases (6261, 6561) 
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Using the third measurement, which is the open share repurchases measurement, the results 
are presented in tables 49-52. In this model, the independent variable is the likelihood of firm 
issuing open share repurchases where Pb SP is equal to 1 if there is any open share 
repurchases event and 0 if there is no open share repurchases event. Using the indicator 
variable for transient institutional investors (Pb TRA) as the independent variable, I find that 
the coefficient estimate for the presence of transient institutional investor is positive and 
highly significant except for column 1. After controlling for endogeniety, in table 50, I find 
that coefficient estimate for the presence of transient institutional investors is positive and 
highly significant across column. This evidence supports my hypotheses where the likelihood 
of firm having short term institutional investors is positively related to the likelihood of firm 
issuing share repurchases. The result suggests that the presence of transient institutional 
investors positively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of share repurchases. 
Next, using the same model, I add another independent variable which measures the 
presence of long term institutional investor (Pb DED). The results are consistent with our 
previous results. The coefficient estimate for the presence of transient institutional investors 
remain positive and highly significant and the coefficient estimate for the presence of 
dedicated institutional investors is not significant across column. In column 2, the coefficient 
estimate for the presence of transient institutional investors is insignificant. However, after 
controlling for endogeneity in table 52, it becomes positive and significant. In other columns, 
the coefficient estimate remains positive and highly significant. The coefficient estimate for 
the presence of dedicated institutional investors remains insignificant across column. The 
results suggests that the presence of transient institutional investors positively and highly 
significantly affects the likelihood of share repurchases and the presence of dedicated 
institutional investors is insignificant.  
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      Intercept [-3.8354]*** [-3.6923]*** [-3.6575]*** [-3.6524]*** [-3.4547]*** 
 
0.1229 0.1818 0.2166 0.2171 0.2384 
Pb Tra 0.2002 0.9223*** 0.9201*** 0.9185*** 1.0257*** 
 
0.2198 0.2922 0.2924 2.93E-01 0.3079 
Size  
 
-3.81E-06 -3.87E-06 -3.96E-06 -3.37E-06 
  
2.40E-05 2.40E-05 2.40E-05 2.10E-05 
Lev 
  
-0.1461 -0.1468 -0.1987 
   
0.5858 0.5868 0.6131 
NOI  
   
-0.00007 -0.00006 
    
0.0168 0.012 
CE 
    
-3.7084 
     
2.9572 
MB 
     
      
      AIC 128.945 74.084 75.919 77.804 77.053 
SIC 147.479 97.666 107.309 116.952 123.691 
            
      Table 49: Probit Regression for open share repurchases  
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First Stage 
     Intercept [-1.7121]*** [-1.7121]*** [-1.7121]*** [-1.7121]*** [-1.7121]*** 
 
0.0213 0.0213 0.0213 0.0213 0.0213 
lag Pb SP 1.7659*** 1.7659*** 1.7659*** 1.7659*** 1.7659*** 
 
0.6224 0.6224 0.6224 0.6224 0.6224 
lag size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev [-0.2575]*** [-0.2575]*** [-0.2575]*** [-0.2575]*** [-0.2575]*** 
  0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 
Second Stage 
     Intercept 4.1956 4.5793 4.58E+00 4.5544 5.3961 
 
17.5964 17.2568 1.72E+01 17.1709 16.8706 
Pb Tra 4.0527*** 3.8651*** 3.8626*** 3.8541*** 4.0036*** 
 
1.2364 1.2378 1.2385 1.2386 1.2532 
Size 
 
0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 
  
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Lev 
  
0.0094 0.0092 0.0057 
   
0.1978 0.1991 0.2173 
NOI 
   
-3.00E-04 -2.00E-04 
    
7.89E-02 6.12E-02 
CE 
    
-7.4779 
     
10.0934 
MB 
     
      IMR -18.1451 -18.0657 -18.0578 -17.9983 -18.4448 
 
22.928 22.4909 22.4347 22.3812 21.9629 
            
AIC 54.5595 54.7547 56.7113 58.6222 59.3783 
BIC 78.102 84.4823 93.8248 103.0384 110.7574 
            
      Table 50: Endogeneity Test for open share repurchases  
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      Intercept [-3.8239]*** [-3.6897]*** [-3.6547]*** [-3.6495]*** [-3.4528]*** 
 
0.1232 0.1819 0.2167 0.2172 0.2384 
Pb TRA 0.1888 0.9197*** 0.9175*** 0.9158*** 1.0235*** 
 
0.22 0.2923 0.2925 2.93E-01 0.308 
Pb DED -2.4899 -2.2059 -2.3778 -2.38E+00 -2.3473 
 
246.3 283.9 458.2 4.54E+02 456 
Size  
 
-3.83E-06 -3.88E-06 -3.97E-06 -3.38E-06 
  
2.40E-05 2.40E-05 2.40E-05 2.10E-05 
Lev 
  
-0.1467 -0.1474 -0.1989 
   
0.5851 0.5861 0.6123 
NOI  
   
-0.00007 -0.00006 
    
0.0167 0.012 
CE 
    
-3.7022 
     
2.9567 
MB 
     
      
      AIC 130.573 76.043 77.877 79.762 79.022 
SIC 158.375 107.486 117.115 126.739 133.433 
            
      Table 51: Probit Regression for Open Share Repurchases  
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First Stage 
     Intercept [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** [-1.4326]*** 
 
0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 
lag Pb Sp 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag size 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
lag lev -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
Second Stage 
     Intercept 4.1766 4.5594 4.56E+00 4.5339 5.3774 
 
17.5925 17.2514 1.72E+01 17.1652 16.8648 
Pb Tra 4.0419*** 3.8536*** 3.851*** 3.8422*** 3.9936*** 
 
1.2364 1.2378 1.2385 1.2385 1.2534 
Pb Ded -19.5406 -1.9977E+01 -1.9985E+01 -2.0007E+01 -1.9895E+01 
 
169992.3 2.06E+05 2.06E+05 2.06E+05 2.15E+05 
Size 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Lev 
  
0.0093 0.0091 0.0056 
   
0.1986 0.1999 0.2182 
NOI 
   
-3.00E-04 -2.00E-04 
    
7.84E-02 6.09E-02 
CE 
    
-7.4634 
     
10.0881 
MB 
     
      IMR -18.1065 -18.025 -18.0167 -17.9563 -18.4087 
 
22.923 22.4839 22.4276 22.3738 21.9553 
            
AIC 56.5384 56.7324 58.6888 60.5993 61.3595 
BIC 87.9284 93.8918 103.225 112.4181 120.0785 
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Continuation from previous table… 
…..Table 52: Endogeneity Test for open share repurchases  
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Previously, we are only considering samples with dividend and share repurchases 
separately. For robustness, I am taking into account firms which issue both dividend and 
share repurchases. Using dividend yield and purchases of common and preferred stock, I 
assign each firm with a certain criteria; high dividend firm, low dividend firm, high share 
repurchases firm and low share repurchases firm. The benchmark for defining high and low 
will be based upon the median of dividend yield and purchases of common and preferred 
stock where firms above median for the corresponding variable will be categorized as high 
and firms below median will be categorized as low. Then using the criteria, I assign the 
likelihood of high dividend firm, low dividend, high share repurchases or low share 
repurchases where the likelihood of the corresponding criteria is equal to 1 if the firm fits the 
criteria and 0 otherwise. 
 In table 53, I define the dependent variable as the likelihood of firm with high dividend and 
low share repurchases (Pb HDLSP). Pb HDLSP is equal to 1 if it is categorized as both high 
dividend and low share purchases firm and 0 otherwise. For the independent variables, I am 
taking into account both short and long term institutional investor using the likelihood of firm 
with long term institutional investors (Pb Ded) and firm with short term institutional investor 
(Pb Tra). I find that the presence of dedicated institutional investors (Pb DED) positively and 
highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing high dividend and low share 
repurchases. I also find that the presence of transient institutional investors (Pb TRA) 
negatively and highly significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing high dividend and 
low share repurchases. After substituting the independent variables with the ownership of 
dedicated institutional investors (PIH DED) and transient institutional investors (PIH TRA), 
the results hold. In terms of presence, the presence of dedicated institutional investors 
increases the likelihood of firm issuing high dividends and under low share repurchases. The 
same goes for transient institutional investors. The presence of transient institutional investors 
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decreases the likelihood of firm issuing high dividend and undertaking low share repurchases. 
In terms of magnitude, higher the dedicated institutional ownership, higher is the likelihood 
of firm issuing high dividend and low share repurchases. Meanwhile for transient institutional 
investors, higher the transient institutional ownership, lower is the likelihood of firm issuing 
high dividend and low share repurchases.   
In the next table, I define the dependent variable as the likelihood of firm issuing low 
dividend and high share repurchase (Pb LDHSP). Pb LDHSP is equal to 1 if the firm is 
categorized as both low dividend and high share repurchases firm and it is 0 otherwise. In this 
table, I find that the presence of dedicated institutional investors (Pb DED) negatively and 
significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing low dividend and high share repurchases.   
While the presence of transient of institutional investors (Pb TRA) positively and 
significantly affects the likelihood of firm issuing low dividend and high share repurchases. 
Using both dependent variables which measure firms issuing both dividends and share 
repurchases, we arrive at the same conclusion.  
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       Intercept 1.488*** 1.4221*** 1.4201*** 1.418*** [-1.8844]*** [-1.8686]*** 
 
0.00328 0.0036 0.00363 0.00363 0.00675 0.0136 
Pb Ded 0.1815*** 0.0744*** 0.073*** 0.0753*** 0.0667* 0.1513*** 
 
0.0216 0.0242 0.0243 2.43E-02 0.0354 0.0574 
Pb Tra 0.0615*** [-0.1022]*** [-0.1004]*** [-0.0978]*** [-0.058]*** [-0.2165]*** 
 
0.0105 0.012 0.0121 1.21E-02 0.0205 0.0395 
Size 
 
[-0.00000224]*** [-0.00000224]*** [-0.00000223]*** -1.49E-07 5.20E-07 
  
7.68E-08 7.67E-08 7.67E-08 1.21E-07 6.20E-07 
Lev 
  
0.00172 0.00172 0.000124 0.063*** 
   
0.00137 0.00136 0.000872 0.0188 
NOI 
   
-0.00071 0.000033 -0.00265 
    
0.000556 0.000356 0.00627 
CE 
    
[-1.3967]*** [-0.2893]*** 
     
0.0778 0.1086 
MB 
     
[-0.00000349]*** 
      
1.97E-06 
       AIC 191754.07 162480.24 161747.17 161124.14 62075.871 17225.535 
SIC 191786.69 162522.58 161800.07 161187.58 62149.448 17298.244 
              
       Table 53: Sample firms with both dividend and share repurchases firms. (High Dividend and low share repurchases) 
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       Intercept [-1.7323]*** [-1.6295]*** [-1.6266]*** [-1.6235]*** [-1.5316]*** [-1.4389]*** 
 
0.00385 0.00408 0.00417 0.00418 0.0052 0.0106 
Pb Ded [-0.248]*** [-0.1613]*** [-0.1602]*** [-0.1625]*** [-0.1072]*** -0.0401 
 
0.0273 0.0294 0.0294 2.95E-02 0.0305 0.05 
Pb Tra 0.00333 0.1545*** 0.1537*** 0.1513*** 0.1665*** 0.0853*** 
 
0.0118 0.0131 0.0132 1.32E-02 0.0135 0.0244 
Size 
 
0.000002122*** 0.000002118*** 0.000002113*** 0.000002608*** 0.000015*** 
  
7.30E-08 7.29E-08 7.28E-08 9.43E-08 5.11E-07 
Lev 
  
[-0.0063]* [-0.00639]* [-0.00867]* 0.0437*** 
   
0.00376 0.00373 0.00454 0.0154 
NOI 
   
0.000903 0.000897 -0.00281 
    
0.000594 0.000604 0.00519 
CE 
    
[-1.17]*** [-1.1494]*** 
     
0.0533 0.0987 
MB 
     
0.0000004592* 
      
2.48E-07 
       AIC 133845.91 122214.48 121679.67 121450.95 117556.61 33719.382 
SIC 133878.54 122256.83 121732.56 121514.38 117630.19 33792.091 
              
       Table 54: Sample firms with both dividend and share repurchases firms.  (Low dividend and high share repurchases) 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The main question in this essay is as following; is the firms’ payout policy related to the 
presence of and the ownership in the hands of certain type of institutional investors? I classify 
the types of institutional investors using the Bushee institutional classification index and link 
it to payout policy. To be specific, I examine whether the presence and ownership of long- 
and short-term institutional investors affect the type and magnitude of the payout where I 
differentiate the payout as dividend and share repurchases. Repurchases are more volatile and 
temporary (Guay and Harford, 2000). Transient institutional investors are known for 
profiteering instead of monitoring in the firm. Since institutional investors are known for their 
role to monitor the firm, transient institutional investors demonstrate a different side of 
institutional investor. Long term institutional investors are known for their monitoring role in 
the firm and tend to stay longer The motivation of this research originated from the 
information advantage hypotheses (Brennan and Thakor, 1990) and  monitoring role 
hypotheses (Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000) where they find that institutional investors 
prefer certain type of payout and firm payout policy attracts institutional investors. However, 
empirically, there is lack of evidence to support the monitoring role. This research is also 
motivated from the perspective of institutional investors’ and the nature of payout policy. 
Bushee (1998, 2001, 2004) finds that different institutional investors have different 
investment profile and objectives. Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) document that 
the nature of dividend and share repurchases are different. Dividend are steadier and issued 
by firms with permanent cash flows while share repurchases are more volatile and temporary 
(Guay and Harford, 2000). The results support my hypotheses where the presence of and 
higher ownership by long term institutional investors increase the likelihood of firms paying 
dividends and the magnitude of dividends. Even after controlling for endogenity, I find that 
the results still hold. I also find that the presence of and higher ownership by short term 
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institutional investors increases the likelihood of firms undertaking share repurchases and the 
magnitude of share repurchases. Again, even after controlling for endogenity, I find that the 
results for this analysis still hold.  
The evidence suggests that the presence and ownership of long term institutional investors 
affect dividend while the presence and ownership of short term institutional investors affect 
share repurchases. 
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